The practice of the rhetorical unconscious of political correctness in Polish newspaper coverage of the Ukraine crisis by Otwinowski, Martha
The practice of the rhetorical unconscious
of political correctness in Polish
newspaper coverage of the Ukraine crisis
Masters Thesis 




University of Helsinki: 
Faculty of Social Sciences
Abstract
This paper is  an attempt to  comprehensively  study Polish national  identity
discourse,  and examine to what  extent  it  automated framing of  newspaper
coverage of a protracted event such as the Ukraine crisis in the period from late
November  2013  until  mid-March  2014.  Lining  out  the  key  tensions  of  the
discursive position of Poland as between 'Europe' and 'the East', the analysis
will  show,  by  turning  its  focus  to  Ukraine,  that  the  Oriental  discourse  of
Eastern Europe did not negatively impact upon Polish foreign policy towards
Ukraine.  Instead,  the paradigm for  the same had been the Eastern mission
exercised through European soft power, and this,  as argued, was especially
visible during the ongoing Ukraine crisis. The findings of the study of coverage
in Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita suggest that the papers accept the Polish
diplomatic stance on the Ukrainian cause as national mission. While the openly
Orientalist discourse of the past was only observed in relation to Russia, the
frames adopted reveal a persistently unequal portrayal of Ukraine as the little
brother in need of guidance, resting on the assumption that such guidance is
desired universally in Ukraine. 
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“Great symbols of Ukraine:
Yanukovych's opponents became a symbol of an enduring battle for freedom and Western
values – who in that very West would lasted all these months protesting? Now they can
become a symbol of unification […].
The events can furthermore be regarded symbolic of an awakening of Polish diplomacy. It has
been long since the actions and words of the foreign minister and prime minister, which,
since a couple of hours, the whole world is listening to, aroused such a sense of pride. […]
Sadly, there is one more symbol – that of Russia's ruthlessness. The country demonstrated
that, for the reconstruction of its empire, it is capable of unleashing hell in Ukraine.”1
Haczynski, J. (2014, 21 February), Rzeczpospolita.
Introduction
The crisis in Ukraine,  which began last  November with protests on Kiev's
Maidan square  following the  decision  of  the  country's  ex-president  Victor
Yanukovych not  to  sign  the  association agreement  with  the  EU,  has  been
termed  the  “biggest  crisis  of  21st century  Europe”  by  leading  European
diplomats,2 as it saw much unprecedented escalation: the continuous protests
escalated  in  February,  followed  by  tense  diplomatic  negotiations  with
Yanukovych, his consequent leaving of office, the takeover by the Ukrainian
interim government, and the Russian military presence in Crimea form early
March, the referendum to join Russia, and, indeed, the ongoing protests in
Ukraine's  Eastern  parts.  If  events  were  closely  monitored by  international
media, they arguably received even more attention in Poland. For observers it
must have seemed as if the crisis in Ukraine was both a personal and a matter
of state for Poles.  The “countless gestures of solidarity in Poland since the
protests  in Kiev began in  November” were acknowledged internationally,3
and singled  out as exemplary in contrast to that of the country's fellow post-
Communist  states.4 In  particular,  Polish diplomatic  efforts  were viewed as
1   Unless otherwise indicated, translations are those of the author.
2   '“Biggest crisis in 21st century Europe”; UK foreign minister on situation in Ukraine' (2014, 03 March),  Euronews.
3   'Poland and Ukraine: Neighbours and brothers' (2014, 03 March), The Economist: Eastern Approaches.
4  'Czech and Slovak views on Ukraine: More timid than the Poles' (2014, 06 March), The Economist: Eastern    
     Approaches.
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successful in the crisis, and the Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski was
considered to be the potential “saviour”5 and “new leader”6 of Europe. 
The  above  cited  article,  published  in  the  Polish  newspaper  Rzeczpospolita,
exemplarily illustrates that the portrayal of the crisis rests on a number of
assumptions on the role and identity of Poland, Ukraine, and Russia.  This
paper  aims  to  dissect  those  assumptions  in  the  present  coverage,  and  to
contextualise them with the larger Polish identity discourse as automatising a
particular narration of events. The relevant discursive cues, as will be argued,
become  particularly  visible  for  an  event  that  bears  the  opportunity  for
positively distinctive identification.
Objectives
As Levintova and Hopf argue, national discourse reflects in the image of the
self and the Other in public opinions, as well as in foreign policy of a country. 7
For Poland, it is argued, national discourse is permeated by the historically
produced  and  reproduced  understanding  of  itself  as  European,  versus  its
geographic  East  as  backward  and  savage.  The  findings  of  the  newspaper
coverage  illustrate  the  persistence  of  the  dominant  narrative  of  Polish
Europeanness in contrast to Russia and Ukraine, albeit, as will be shown, it
markedly  transformed  with  regards  to  the  latter:  what  began  as  a  pro-
Ukrainian elite-mission that contrasted with continuous images of Ukrainian
backwardness in Poland, appears to have become accepted as the prevalent
discourse.  While  much more sympathetic  towards Ukraine,  such narration
retains the notion of Polish superiority.
5   Weiss, M. (2014, 30 April) 'Can Radek Sikorski save Europe?', Foreign Policy. 
6   'Konflikt służy Sikorskiemu? Udziela się w BBC i CNN według czeskiego tygodnika jest "nowym liderem   
     Europy"'(2014, 17 March), Gazeta Wyborcza.
7   See this paper, pp. 5-6.
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The  study  will  first  set  out  to  delineate  key  insights  from  literature  on
national identification, and situate them in the larger debate on discursively
entrenched ethnic markers of 'European' versus 'Eastern', a tension which, as
will  be shown, is crucial to the Polish understanding of the self.  It  will be
argued that the need to emphasise a positively distinctive identity impacted
on exclusive national story-telling in multiple ways.  Cultural  works which
express  such  practice  of  the  rhetorical  unconscious  as  defined  below,
discursively  differentiated  Poland  from  its  Eastern  neighbours;  as  will  be
shown with a focus on Ukraine, historic discourse significantly shaped the
image of  the Other in Poland.  In contrast,  however,  foreign policy will  be
contextualised as guided by ideas of an Eastern mission by soft power means.
The overall research question which this paper will attempt to answer in its
analysis  of  Polish  newspaper  coverage  of  the  events  in  Ukraine  from
November 2013 - March 2014, is to what extent the image of the Polish self
and  the  Other  -  Ukraine  and  Russia  -,  informs  the  framing  of  the  crisis.
Critical discourse analysis serves as indicating the epistemological position
for  this  study,  in  its  attempt  to  interrogate  and  contextualise  present
knowledge  with  past  discourse.  The  present  media  narratives  will  be
analysed through a dissection of the frames through which events have been
portrayed; the totality of the frames allows to draw modest conclusions on the
overall  present  discourse  as  narrating  the  Ukraine  crisis  during  the  time-
frame studied.8
The Ukraine crisis appears to present an opportunity for positively distinctive
identification,  and  hence  is  revealing  in  terms  of  the  singularitisation  of
discourse which automatises an unconscious rhetoric of political patriotism.
8 In line with limitations Levintova (2010: 1344) suggested for discursive analysis in newspaper coverage, this 
study refrains from making universal claims as to its findings and acknowledges the subjectivity of an 
interpretivist approach. While the sample of articles studied can be regarded as representative of the 
newspapers' positions to a certain extent, it is reasonable to assume that the consideration of a different, or larger 
set of articles would have lead to different conclusions.
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Polish politics and respectively aligned media - which usually display a high
degree of antagonism - will be illustrated as forming an rather harmonious
concert, as Polish diplomacy is assessed favourably, and the Europeanisation
of Ukraine appeared accepted as Polish mission. As will be pointed out, such
singularisation of narrative necessarily marginalises any possible dissenting
voice.
Conceptual framework
This study is interested in the ways in which understanding of the self and
Other are constructed so as to weave a common-sensical fabric, and create a
lens through which events are represented. The way to begin, therefore, is by
asking how such understanding is produced, and the conceptual framework
that  suggests  itself  for  this  purpose  is  that  of  Critical  Discourse  Analysis
(CDA). CDA is an epistemological approach which treats language as social
practice,9 as  “signifying  a  particular  domain  […]  from  a  particular
perspective”.10 Linguistic scholarship was very influential on the method: in
the  early  20th century,  Wittgenstein  noted  the  necessary  contextuality of
language and rejected the  notion that  it  could,  at  any time,  be  neutral  or
value-free.11 CDA is  frequently used to study the ways in which language
serves  to  manifest  or  legitimise  power,  how it  relates  to  those  with  most
influence on public discourse, the ways in which it is ideologically tied up.
Van Djik argued that knowledge is encoded socially in both the content and
the  style  in  which  it   presented.12 Fairclough  established  such  an  explicit
linkage between language use and social structures, arguing that it is “always
9 Wodak, R. (2000) 'Does Sociolinguistics need Social Theory? New Perspectives in Critical Discourse Analysis', 
Conference Papers, Bristol, 27 April.
10 Fairclough, N. (1995) Critical Discourse Analysis. Boston: Addison Wesley, p. 14. 
11 Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell Ltd.
12 Van Dijk (1991), in Maneri, M; ter Wal, J. (2005) 'The Criminalisation of Ethnic Groups: An Issue for Media 
Analysis', FQS – Forum: Qualitative Social Research, Vol. 6 (3), September.
4
simultaneously  constitutive  of  (i)  social  identities,  (ii)  social  relations  (iii)
systems of knowledge and beliefs”.13 Social constructivist thought adopted a
position which seeks to uncover the myths underpinning our understanding,
applying  discursive  investigation  explicitly  to  the  study  of  collective
identity:14 Hopf, in his critique of traditional International Relations studies,
argues that a state's identity, closely intertwined with the discourse around its
characteristics, crucially informs domestic and foreign policy choices.15 One
key tool of CDA is the appreciation of knowledge in socio-historical context.
Scholars  such  as  Habermas  stress  the  context  of  knowledge  and  use  of
language  as  embedded  historically  and  underpinned  by  “underlying
conventions  and  rules”.16 The  emphasis  of  language  as  instrumental  -
especially  by  Foucault,  whose  theories  were  highly  influential  for
interrogating the hegemonic discourse - led to CDA being a popular method
to investigate racial  or  gender bias in the media.  For  this  study,  however,
power  over language  is  less  relevant.17 While  it  is  true  that  discourse
legitimises authority in producing its existence as if common sense, the Polish
example, it will be shown, is primarily illustrative of the power that lies  in
language.18 The example of Polish national identity discourse in relation to
Ukraine and Russia illustrates that language and the knowledge it produces
of the self and Other - rather than consciously instrumental - are produced by,
and reproduce, an automated frame which suggests certain interpretations of
an event such as the Ukraine crisis. The question of 'who started it and why' is
therefore less important than the inquiry of how persistent discourse is, and
13 Fairclough (1993) p. 134,  in Titscher, S. Meyer, M; Wodak, R. Vetter, E. (2000) Methods of Text and Discourse 
Analysis. London: Sage Publication, p. 149.
14 Crotty defines social constructivism as a position which holds that “all knowledge, and all meaningful reality as 
such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings, 
and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context” Crotty (2003), p. 42. In Mole, R. (2007) 
‘Discursive Identities/Identity Discourses and Political Power’ in Mole, R. (ed.) Discursive Constructions of Identity 
in European Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 4.
15 Hopf, T. (2002) Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999. New 
York: Cornell University Press. 
16  Titscher; Meyer; Wodak; Vetter (2000), p. 148.
17 Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony, which involves predominance over discourse and thus can signify 
meaning from the domain of particular actors. Gramsci (1971), in Titscher; Meyer; Wodak; Vetter (2000), p. 151.
18  Wodak (1996) pp. 17-20, in Titscher; Meyer; Wodak; Vetter (2000) p. 146.
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to what extent it informs the ways in which unexpected events are viewed.
Levintova's  study  on  the  image  of  Russia  and  Poland  in  their  respective
newspapers precisely draws on such social constructivist position that does
not assume a “direct causal link” by which elites seek to maintain positions of
power,19 but  holds  that  public  discourse  informs  views  of  the  public  and
politicians'  actions  in  “more  or  less  unconscious  ways”.20 Indeed,  the
argument  put  forward  here  is  that  discourse  operates  by  ways  of  the
rhetorical unconscious, in structures of social meaning, which are formed by,
and re-inform public discourse.21 Thus, critical discursive analysis forms the
conceptual  framework for  this  study in the way in  which it  considers  the
reproduction  of  narratives  on  identities  over  time,22 and  “integrates  […]
available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the
social and political fields in which discursive 'events' are embedded”.23 
Section One
Theorising the construction of the self and the Other
Exclusive national identity
The scholarly debate on national identity can be regarded as decided by the
constructivist over the primordialist camp.24 In line with the critical discursive
epistemological stance, from a social constructivist  perspective, the nation-
state is a creation.  Barth argues that none of the characteristics of groups -
19 Levintova, E. (2010) 'Good Neighbours? Dominant Narratives about the ‘Other’ in Contemporary Polish and 
Russian Newspapers', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 62 (8), p.1340, with reference to Checkel (1998).
20 Klotz; Lynch (2007), p. 47, in Levintova (2010), p. 1340.
21  Kress and Hodge's (1979) work, which pointed to the inter-linkage of social meaning with discourse,“was 
subsequently accepted by researchers from different traditions, such as sociolinguistics, formal linguistics, social 
psychology or literary criticism”,  Titscher; Meyer; Wodak; Vetter (2000), p. 145.
22 Bloemmert, J. (2005) Discourse: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.29.
23 Wodak (2000).
24 Primordialists, in correspondence with the general international consensus, hold the nation up as a community 
naturally bound together by essential, common characteristics. For a closer analysis see Bačová, V.  (1998) 'The 
Construction of National Identity On Primordialism and Instrumentalism', Human Affairs, Vol. 1, pp. 29 – 43.
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according  to  Prizel,  nations  share  language,  religion,  geographic  location,
collective  memory  and  cultural  practices -25 are  fixed  across  time.26 The
scholar's theories were very influential to subsequently published works on
ethnic and national identification.27 Gordon, in her analysis on Polish national
minorities in the countries of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
argues,  that  a  sense  of  collective  identity  is  not  formed  through  an
introspective process: it proceeds necessarily  exclusively, in relation to those
who become perceived as “Other”.28 Barth refers to such mutually exclusive
attribution  of  characteristics  as  ethnic  markers.29 Levintova  employs  those
very markers to analyse the existence of pre-Communist narratives in Poland
and  Russia.30 Özkirimli argues  that  the  particular  choice  of  narrative  or
salience-making  of  characteristics  over  others  should  form  the  centre  of
analysis around the nation-state.31 
The mutually exclusive construction of nations as an ongoing process is an
important consideration for this  study.  It  is  argued that once ascribed and
discursively produced as common-sensical, ethnic markers, while bearing the
capacity to transform, will not change rapidly. This is because, firstly, such
ascription  implies  essential  characteristics,  and  secondly,  these  become
unconsciously  reproduced  by  all  kinds  of  actors  of  the  public  discourse.
Lastly, one frequently missing dimension in the process of identification and
acceptance of mutually exclusive ethnic markers needs to be introduced. Mole
notes that the reason for successful collective identification can be explained
by psychological  factors:  as  it  is  impossible  to  tediously  assess  all  human
25 Prizel, I. (1998) National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 16.
26 Barth, F. (1969) ‘Introduction’, in Barth Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Differences. 
Boston: MA, Little & Brown.
27 Levintova references Vincent (1974); Sahlins (1976); Boyd & Richerson (1987); Salamone (1997. Levintova (2010), 
p.1340.
28 Gordon, E. (1996) 'The revival of polish national consciousness: A comparative study of Lithuania, Belarus, and 
Ukraine', Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol. 24 (2), p. 217.
29 Levintova (2010), p. 1340.
30 Ibid., pp. 1339-1361.
31 Özkirimli, U. (2003) ‘The nation as an artichoke? A critique of ethno-symbolist interpretations of nationalism’, 
Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 9 (3), pp. 339 – 355.
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experiences  anew,  demarcations are unavoidable:32 such categorisation and
identification  is  the  fulfilment  of  our  “basic  human  need  for  cognitive
parsimony”.33  What is more, human psychology requires us to be part of a
positively distinctive group, as the creation of collectives necessitates a certain
positioning of these groups against each other. As Mole furthermore argues,
such  identification  creates  dependency  upon  self-esteem  on  the  group's
achievements.34 
Oriental Eastern Europe 
It was illustrated that national identity is constructed in relation to an Other,
and  that  the  ethnic  markers  which  bundle  this  exclusive  identity  inform
public  discourse.  While  research  such  as  Levintova's  focuses  on  national
identity construction versus another nation, this paper argues that the larger
geopolitical  context  is  crucial  for  understanding  the  dynamics  of  identity-
creation, particularly in the case of Poland. It will be shown that the Polish
self-understanding  can  be  viewed as  a  result  of  its  historically  peripheral
position between the broadly defined East  and West.  The most  influential
scholarship on the “power of labelling,  othering and exclusion inherent to
presumably neutral  geographic  terms”,35 arguably is  post-colonial  thought.
Said's work, in which he showed how European ascriptions of backwardness
and  savagery  to  other  regions  ultimately  served  as  justifications  of
colonialism,  can  be  regarded  as  central  to  this  school  of  thought.36 As
Riabchuck notes in his critique of the notion of Eurasia, terminology which “is
rather political, cultural, and ideological than purely geographical”, serves as
32 Mole (2007), p. 8.
33 Hogg and Abrams (1988), p. 72. In Mole (2007), p. 3.
34   Mole (2007), p. 9.
35  Riabchuck, M. (2011) 'Western “Eurasianism” and the “New Eastern Europe”: Discourse of Exclusion',   
      Postcolonial Europe.
36 Said, E. (1979) Orientalism. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
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a demarcation against the more proximate East.37 As he illustrates, Kundera
and other Eastern European intellectuals and scholars criticised such Othering
early on:
“ ‘Eastern Europe’ became like a stigma that signified the inferiority of the region, its
primordial backwardness, lack of political freedom, of civic liberties, of rule of law”.38 
The intellectuals started using the terminology of Central and Eastern Europe
to circumvent what they viewed as a classification of inferiority.39 Indeed, as
the stigma of  Eastern European does not provide much scope for positively
distinctive  Polish  identification,  analogous  to  Zizek's  observation  that,  for
“any  South  European  country  the  Balkans  start  behind  its  Southeastern
border”,40 Poland  considers  itself  Central  European.  However,  as
characteristics ascribed to the region remained entrenched in public discourse
and consciousness, this endeavour had very limited impact. 
Especially in the last decade, a number of publications addressing the label of
Eastern  Europe  and  the  exclusive  effect  of  the  creation  of  an  European
identity, started from such a Saidian notion. Kuus argues that post-colonial
theory  illustrates  the  EU's  enlargement  processes  as  the  “production  of
alterity”, with its institutions manifesting European identity in opposition to a
purportedly  essentially  different  Eastern  Europe.41 The  scholar  holds  that
while such discourse is inconsistent and fluid - as it implies the possibility to
transition into becoming fully European -  instead of leading, as might be
assumed, to  the dissolution of  Eastern Europe,  only to its  multiplication.42
Neumann's  Uses  of  the  Other,  which  draws  on  Said's  theories,  too,  was
influential  for  research  on  the  discourse  of  Otherness  of  Eastern  Europe.




40 Zizek (1994), in Zarycki, T. (2004) 'Uses of Russia: The Role of Russia in the Modern Polish National Identity', 
East European Politics and Societies, Vol.18, p. 603.
41 Kuus, M. (2004)  'Europe's eastern expansion and the reinscription of otherness in East-Central Europe', 
Progressive Human Geography, Vol. 28, p. 473.
42 Ibid., p. 484.
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position that “the mythical East has historically been one of the significant
others in the formation of European identity”.43 Ostrowska's work, which will
be relevant in the analysis of Polish cultural works on Ukraine,44 contends, on
the basis of Neumann's theories, that all of the “many 'Easts' in the world”
serve as signify something.45 In line with this study's conceptual framework,
the construction of a region, rather than being a consciously instigated project,
should be  viewed as  a  practice  discursively  perpetuated by many.  In  this
respect, Dainotto notes that the idea of what constitutes Europe was produced
by  “a  rhetorical  unconscious:  what  has  been  said  and  written  about  and
around Europe over centuries [...] determines what we think and do about
it”.46 
Stenning, in her critical analysis of Area Studies, appeals for a re-examination
of the separate study of the geographies of Eastern and Western Europe.47
Although the scholar acknowledges certain historically distinct experiences,
she argues that continuing to treat Eastern and Western Europe as separate
results  in  overlooking  the  connections;  she  proceeds  to  demonstrate,  with
examples  of  the  role  of  Poland  in  current  international  politics,48 that  the
Polish  case  constitutes  such  a  linkage  between  the  supposedly  separate
geographic  and  cultural  units.  The  question  raised  by  Stenning  as  to  the
Polish belonging lies  at the heart  of this  paper.  As Poland continues to be
viewed through  an  Eastern  European  prism by  research  in  the  West,  the
national understanding of the self underscores European identity, which, in
the  regional  discourse,  appears  as  more  positively  distinctive.  As
Killingsworth  et  al.  argue,  “while Poles  regarded  themselves  as  an
43 Zarycki (2004), p. 599, referencing Neumann (1999), p. 103.
44 A small number of scholarship engaged with the essentialisation of Eastern Europe and Russia in Polish cultural 
works; these works will be referenced below.
45 Neumann (1999), p. 15. In Ostrowska, E. (2011) 'Desiring the Other: The Ambivalent Polish Self in Novel and 
Film', Slavic Review, Vol. 70 (3), p. 507.
       Ostrowska furthermore notes Todorova's study on 'Balkanism', and the flexible usages of the Orient in identity 
construction. Ostrowska (2011), p. 507. 
46 Dainotto, R. (2007) Europe (In Theory). Duke University Press, pp. 7- 8.
47 Stenning, A. (2005) 'Out there and in here: studying Eastern Europe in the West', Area, Vol. 37 (4), p. 378.
48 Ibid., p. 379.
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ineffaceable part of Europe, Western Europe (the ‘real’ Europe) did not share
their  sense  of  belonging”.49 As  the  scholars  note,  Poles  are  aware  of  the
asymmetry in their relationship with Western Europe in many ways. The lack
of  presence  of  Poland  in  the  narrative  of  Europe  contrasts  with  Western
Europe having been the focal point of Polish discourses, especially among the
country's elites.50 As Killingsworth et al. point out, the “nineteenth century
spiritual and political national elites […] created the myth of Poland as the
eastern flank of Western Europe”,51 as being its Easternmost stronghold of
values. 
'Remembering' Polish European Past: Exclusionary narration of 
what constitutes Poland
Poland's emphasis of European belonging requires a concerted exclusionary
narration  of  historic  events,  what  Porter  referred  to  as  “an  ideologically
loaded conceptual  framework  that  gives  specific  meaning to  the  past  and
helps  determine what is  remembered and what  is  forgotten.”52 As  will  be
shown below, this plays out strongly in the ascription and entrenchment of
own  versus  Eastern  ethnic  markers.  In  line  with  the  argument  of  the
unconscious rhetoric in the process of identity narration, rather than viewing
such singularisation of  discourse as deliberately manipulative practice,  the
European  narrative  “penetrated  the  level  of  explicit  argumentation  to  the
realm of reflexive linguistic practice”.53 This will be shown with reference to
Zarycki's centre-periphery paradigm, which illustrates the need for  Poland's
49 Killingsworth, M.; Klatt, M.; Auer, S. (2010) ‘Where does Poland Fit in Europe? How Political Memory Influences 
Polish MEPs’ Perceptions of Poland’s Place in Europe’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 11 (4), p. 
370.
50  Killingsworth, M.; Klatt, M.; Auer, S. (2010) . See also: Jedlicki (1992), p. 345 and Mach (2000), p.6, p. 360.
51 Ibid., p. 359.
52 Porter, B. (2001) 'The Catholic Nation: Religion, Identity, and the Narratives of Polish History', The Slavic and East 
European Journal, Vol. 45, (2), p. 291
53 Ibid., p. 292.
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discursive  delineation  against  Russia.  The  way  in  which  such  Polish
superiority has been narrated will be exemplified by cultural works, which, in
their reference to Polish history, demonstrate a practice of such unconscious
political patriotism.
Excluding Russia 
As  was  illustrated  above,  the  discursive  construction  of  national  identity
requires  positively  distinctive  ethnic  markers.  The  Polish  case  is  one  of
peculiar  preoccupation  of  such  positioning,  as  Zarycki  argued,  due  to  its
peripheral geographic and discursive position. The scholar views both Poland
and Russia  as  “peripheries  in  relation  to  the  broadly  defined West”.54 He
categorises different usages of Russia in Polish discourse, all of which make
the latter appear positively distinctive. According to Zarycki, one important
frame which narrates Poland as European, morally superior, is the silencing
or explicit rejection of Russian influence on Poland in political, economic or
cultural  terms.  Narratives  of  Polish  inner  resistance,  immunity,  have
especially  been  prominent  retrospectively,  after  times of  Russian authority
over Poland. Zarycki references a newspaper article on the Polish 18th century
partition, in which the author suggests that from Russian occupation, Poles
merely  remembered  the  omnipresence  of  Vodka,  and  a  type  of  primitive
carriage.55 On the  other  hand,  Germany had  been  allegedly  recognised as
“wise even if  strict  father”.56 The scholar observes a peculiar constraint on
Polish public discourse, referencing Tazbir's conception of “political patriotic
correctness”  and  the  pressures  on  Polish  19th century  writers to  narrate
Poland's  Europeanness,  but  notes  that  such strains  persists  until  present.57
Such narration, however, neglects that many Polish writers and intellectuals,
54 Zarycki (2004), p. 596.
55 Klopotowski (2003) in Zarycki (2004), p. 605.
56 Ibid.
57 Tazbir (2003), in Zarycki (2004),p. 605.
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in fact, preferred the idea of the Slavic civilisation over Western Europe:58 the
East was viewed,  “even if less sophisticated, […] as being organic, spiritual,
humane, based not upon greed but upon true Christian values”.59 It appears
that the grand oppositional narratives surrounding the “mythical  East”,  of
“body - mind […] barbarian - civilised, totalitarian - democratic”60 and others,
which served for Europe to delineate itself discursively from the East, were
discursively  utilised  in  Poland  to  either  more  fervent  demarcation,  or  to
express fascination. This analysis argues, however, that the Orientalisation of
Eastern Europe does not pertain to Russia exclusively, although the country
does play a particular role.61 
In the prevalent pro-European narrative, Russia was framed as the ultimate
Other. Misiak's analysis of the national epics directed by Andrzej Wajda's, Pan
Tadeusz [Pan  Tadeusz:  the  last  Foray  of  Lithuania]  (1999),  and  Katyn  (2007)
illustrates rejection of Russia exemplarily, and can be viewed as a practice of
unconscious patriotic political correctness. Misiak understands Wajda's films
as “an integral part of Polish political and cultural discourse, deeply rooted in
the national tradition”.62 The choices of the themes are telling in themselves.
Pan  Tadeusz,  an  adaptation  of  the  work  of  the  same  title  written  by  the
national writer Adam Mickiewicz, narrates the story of the Polish-Lithuanian
military support of Napoleon against the common Russian enemy. The high
morale and discipline of Poles in terms of obeying national culture is shown
“on multiple  occasions”.63 Mickiewicz's  work had already caused Russian-
58 Tornquist-Plewa referred to this strand of thought as the ‘Slavophile direction of Polish political discourse’ (2002),
pp. 222–224. In Killingsworth et al. (2001), p. 360.
       Zdziechowski's essay On the Russian Influence on the Polish Soul is a further case in point. Zdziechowski (2004), in 
Zarycki (2004), p. 605. 
59 Jedlicki (1990), pp. 41–42), in Killingsworth et al. (2001), p. 360.
60 Zarycki (2004), p. 602, with reference to Neumann (1999), p. 103.
61 While this study acknowledges that the observation of an Oriental discourse on Russia is not new per se, it is 
necessary to contextualise it with the Polish self-understanding, in order to study how the same was visible 
during the Ukraine crisis.
       As will be demonstrated below, the current crisis presents an opportunity to study how such narration plays out 
in what is perceived as a race for the future of Ukraine - progress or backwardness -, and reveals insights into the
present Polish confidence against its Eastern neighbour and its European identity. 
62 Misiak, A. (2013) 'Don't Look to the East: National Sentiments in Andrzej Wajda's Contemporary Film Epics', 
Journal of Film and Video, Vol. 65 (3), p. 26.
63 Ibid., p. 31.
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Polish tensions during the Soviet Union, as the popular play had become “an
occasion for symbolic articulation of moral superiority over the Russians”,64
and was banned for decades; evidently, the narration of savage Russia could
not  be  practised amidst  the  official  narrative  of  Soviet  brotherhood.65 The
allocation  of  dichotomous  ethnic  markers  in  a  way  which  appears
exaggerated to a critical audience as historically flawed,66 Wajda feeds into
positively distinctive Polish national identification, achieved through various
visual,  stylistic,  and  narrative  elements.  In  Pan  Tadeusz,  the  depiction  of
Russian soldiers  could hardly be more pejorative:  they “not only […] lack
skills,  courage,  and  wisdom,  but  they  are  also  presented  as  a  corrupted
crowd. Their leader […] turns out to be a sly national traitor”.67 A crucial
message of the film is the Polish positioning towards the West, as Pan Tadeusz
leaves “no doubt” about the alliance with France being the right choice for
Poland.68
Hardly a better example of Polish national identity discourse versus Russia
than  Katyn  could  be  found.  The  killing  of  20,000  members  of  Polish
intelligentsia during World War II by the Soviet military, indeed, continues to
be a major tension between Russia and Poland at present, and is the focus of
Wajda's most recent film.  Katyn narrates the story of morally superior Poles
who survived Soviet occupation thanks to their “unusual strength”.69 The film
illustrates  as-if  natural  Polish  aversion  against  anything  Soviet,  as  the
characters  surviving  the  massacre  are  shown  in  their  difficult  struggle
holding  their  heads  up  high,  while  “Jerzy,  the  only  Polish  character  who
overtly sways toward communism, quickly realizes his mistake and commits
a  spectacular  suicide”.70 The  significance  of  cultural  works  of  such  high
64 Thompson, E. (2005) 'Ways of Remembering: the Case of Poland', Toronto Slavic Quarterly.
65 Ibid.
66 Misiak (2013), p. 29.
67 Ibid., p. 31.
68 Ibid., p. 32.
69 Ibid., p. 27.
70 Ibid., p. 34.
14
visibility  in  public  discourse  can  hardly  be  overstated.  Wajda's  works  are
expressive of, and feed into the discourse on Russia and the East in general,
while underscoring Polish Europeanness, a practice that can be viewed as that
of the rhetorical unconscious.
Polish religiosity as proof of European belonging
Porter's  historic  constructivist  study  questions  the  seemingly  “inextricably
intertwined” position of Catholicism with Polish national identity, which, as
he  notes,  is  accepted by  most  scholarship.71 His  scrutiny of  Polish history
reveals  important  moments  of  uncertainty,  which,  as  he  notes,  had  been
explained  away  in  “delicate  rhetorical  maneuvers  in  order  to  sustain
[Catholics'] story against the threat of dissident voices”.72 One uncomfortable
historic  reality for  Catholics,  as  Porter  argues,  was the strong influence of
Calvinists  in  the  Polish  senate  of  the  16th century.  The  de  facto  religious
fragmentation of the country at the time came to be framed as tolerance of
foreigners in expectation of acceptance Polish Catholic culture.73 As he shows,
religion  gradually  became  an  important  ethnic  marker  of  the  Polish  self,
signifying one's European identity versus the Orthodox East,  and could be
discursively  used  to  out-argue  Polish  Eastern  belonging  due  to  it  Slavic
language.74 Poland's  frequently  cited  role  as  'Bulwark  of  Christendom'  is
crucial in this respect. Zarycki argues that “Poles credit themselves with [a
number of instances of] saving Europe, or at least particular countries such as
Belgium and France, from the Russian threat”.75 The country's success in the
17th century  battle  against  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Vienna  is  the  most
frequently cited example.76 The scholar furthermore points out that the idea of
71 Porter (2001), pp. 289-299. See for the scholarship he refers to: Bernhard (1993), p. 136; Lipski, (1994), p. 52.
72 Ibid., p. 291.
73 Ibid., pp. 291-292.
74 Ibid., p. 289.
75 Zarycki (2004), p. 611.
76 Ibid., p.610
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the  East  as  a  threat  acquired  symbolic  value  for  Polish  national  identity,
standing for “the numerous sacrifices made by Poles over the centuries for the
sake  of  Western  Europe”.77 Lastly,  a crucial  element  of  the  Polish  Eastern
discourse related to the religious narrative is the historic self-conception of “a
messianic  nation  entrusted  with  bringing  Western  values  to  other  Slavic
nations”,78 thus bound to a mission to Europeanise the East. As will be shown
below, the Eastern mission myth, albeit revised, persists until present.
Narrating superiority over Ukraine
The Polish discourse on Ukraine is generally less researched. It, too, needs to
be considered in the larger context of Eastern European narratives. As will be
argued, the image of Ukraine in Poland, until very recently was marked by
such Oriental  themes.  This  is  reflected in the ethnic  markers attributed to
country and people - as will be demonstrated in the following section – and is
thus  suggestive  of  persistent  narration  past  public  discourse.  Henryk
Sienkiewicz's work Ogniem I Mieczem [With Fire and Sword], as well as the 1999
film adaptation by Jerzy Hoffman is crucial in this respect.  As Gombrowicz,
poignantly commented, 
"it is difficult to find a comparable example of the captivation of an entire nation, or of a more
mesmerizing hold on the imagination of the masses in the history of literature”.79
While  Sienkiewicz  wrote  the  book  during  the  Polish  partition  of  the  19 th
century,  it  takes  the  reader  back  to  the  times  of  the  17 th century  Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth,  around its  peak time,  when the  Polish gentry
77 Ibid.
       The discourse on religiosity combined with the historic role of Polish suffering under aggression from both 
Germany and Russia, the country's national identity bears a significant element of martyrdom and sacrifice. 
Thompson points to the symbolic value of Polish religious sites: “there is hardly a church in Warsaw that does 
not have some kind of memorial inside or outside”,Thompson (2005). This way, it can be argued, churches serve 
as double reminders of Polish suffering. 
78 Levintova (2010), p. 1342, referencing Kepinski (1990), Kiraly (2000), Macheevskii (2000), and Kornal (2002.
79 Gombrowicz, in Hauser, E. (2000) 'Reconstruction of National Identity: Poles and Ukrainians among others in 
Jerzy Hoffman's film "With Fire and Sword" ', The Polish Review, Vol. 45 (3), p. 308.
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successfully suppressed the uprising of the Ukrainian Cossacks:
the “current territories of Poland and its immediate eastern neighbours (Ukraine, Belarus and
Lithuania) once formed the ‘largest realm of early modern Europe’ – the Polish–Lithuanian
Commonwealth, established in 1569”,80 
and  thus  are  a  time-frame  very  suitable  for  positively  distinctive
identification.  While  the  Polish  intellectuals Gombrowicz  and  Milosz
criticised  With Fire  and Sword for  “its  historical  mystification,  its  conceited
image of the nation, and its shameless promotion of the dominant Roman
Catholicism”,81 its  permanent  place  in  the  school  curriculum  and  general
prominence remain overwhelming until present. Sienkiewicz's dichotomous
assignment of ethnic markers as civilised, Catholic, noble Poland versus the
savage Ukrainians – Cossacks and Tatars - are criticised universally by the
relevant  scholarship.  Ostrowska  illustrates  examples  of  the  book's
Orientalisation  of  land  and  people:  the  “countryside  is  portrayed  as
'untamed,'  'a  savage landscape'  with 'immense seas  of  blowing,  head-high
grass  where  only  eagles,  hawks  and  vultures  [soared],  with  fleeting  grey
wolves  running  the  night'”;82 the  Ukrainian  peasants  are  referred  to  as  a
dehumanised  “black  mob”.83 The  Ukrainian  scholar  Tarnavsky  notes  that,
through the nature of the theme picked by Hoffman, by default, the director
failed to depict Ukrainians as anything other than “wild and uncivilised”, as
“the work remains essentially Sienkiewicz's”.84 However, other assessments of
the film adaptation interpret a somewhat more nuanced image of the Other.
Ostrowska, too, views the film as re-enacting dichotomous categories: in line
with the argument of the Orientalisation of the East, she notes that both the
book and the film “attempt to attach Polishness to the western paradigm by
80 Killingsworth et al. (2010), referencing Snyder (2003), p. 1.
81  Hauser (2000), p. 306.
82 Ostrowska (2011), p. 510 referencing Sienkiewicz (1991), pp. 3–4. 
83 Ibid., p. 511.
84 Tarnavsky, Y. (2000) 'With Camera and Actors: Reflections of a Ukrainian on Jerzy Hoffman's "With Fire and 
Sword" ', The Polish Review, Vol. 45 (3), p. 322.
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appropriating its discourse of orientalism”.85 However, she holds that stylistic
elements of the novel and visual elements of the film reveal national identity
self-doubts and an ambiguous attitude towards the East. Ostrowska argues
that  the  logic  of  Orientalisation  operates  on  denigration  to  the  extent  of
fascination of the Other, relocating suppressed characteristics to the foreign
place; such fascination, as she holds, is visible in the description of the main
Ukrainian adversary Bohun as dark, but of Ukrainian beauty.86 Furthermore,
an element of sympathy for Bohun can be interpreted in the film's final scene,
when  the  camera  follows  him  through  the  “female  gaze  of  the  Polish
heroine”.87 As Ostrowska emphasises, this reveals Polish ambiguity towards
the East, with open Orientalisation contradicting the simultaneous desire for
proximity. Arguably, a retrospective notion of regret for the falling apart of
the Commonwealth and the disunity between Poland and Ukraine could be
interpreted here.  Ostrowska contextualises the timing of the publication of
both the book and the film as indicating a sense of direction for Poland in a
changed international context, thus - in line with this paper's argument - as
practice of the rhetorical unconscious of political patriotism: the narrative of
civilised  Europe  versus  the  backward  East  aided  both  Polish  self-esteem
during the times of partition, and explained away potential doubts in terms of
Polish EU membership.88 Hauser too, views the film in the context of political
events of the time.  Her focus lies  on the analysis of what she refers  to  as
linguistic codes: The dominant language of the film is Polish, and the true
Polish characters, in a typical fashion of dominant culture, insist on speaking
Polish exclusively. The dominant code is thus asserted with the  assumption
“that  the  'others'  must  know it”;89 however, various  languages  are  spoken
throughout the film with frequent switching. The scholar illustrates, with the
85 Ostrowska (2011), p. 522.
86 Ibid., p. 512.
87 Ibid., p. 515.
88 Ibid., p. 506.
89 Hauser (2000), p. 311.
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example of Bohun's switching between Polish and Ukrainian, his awareness
and acceptance of the dominant culture, hence the “unequal 'brother nations'
relationship”.90 Hauser concludes that such usage of linguistic codes positions
the Cossack as subordinated, domesticated Other, while the Tatars serve as
the ultimate Other in the story:
“Hoffman replaces the Ukrainians...who constituted the 'other' helping to define Polishness
for Sienkiewicz a century ago, by those who are less threatening to the present Polish reason
of state: the far-away oriental Tatars (who also had been, conveniently, exterminated by Soviet
Russia), and demonic homosexuals, represented by a transvestite and a witch.”91
The scholar regards such usage of  familiarity and difference as an future-
orientated message, an expression of the desire to “revise the Eastern mission
myth”,92 as  reinvigorating the vision of  Poland as  the Bulwark of  Europe,
which legitimises its entry into the EU, while turning its gaze Eastwards.93 As
shall be argued below, Polish foreign policy towards Ukraine since 1989, and
especially during the crisis from autumn until spring 2013-14, indeed suggests
that Poland is seeking to complete the revolution of 1989, with European tools
of soft power.
To greater or lesser extent, research on With Fire and Sword found depiction of
Ukraine  as  Eastern,  subordinate  and  backward  in  comparison  to  Poland.
Indeed,  in  Polish  history-narration,  Ukraine  too,  has  come  to  be  viewed
through an Oriental lens. The centre-periphery paradigm necessitates Polish
discursive  positioning  in  Europe,  and  can  help  explain  selective  history-
telling  and  remembrance.  Zarycki  remarked  on  the  complexity  of  Polish
identity as a combination of minority complex toward the West,94 and - with
reference to Kurczewska - a superiority complex directed Eastwards, as he
refers to it, an imperial complex:95  
90 Ibid., p. 314.
91 Ibid., p. 317.
92   Ibid., p. 306.
93 Ibid., p. 310.
94 Albeit he attributes this fact to a post-colonial setting, which prompts frustration with persistent material relative
deprivation despite independence. This paper disagrees with this notion, as Polish efforts to emphasise European
belonging can be traced to centuries before. 
95 Zarycki (2004), p. 601, referencing Kurczewska (2003).
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“a conviction of the special status of Poland on the international scene, or at least in Central-
Eastern Europe, has survived and is clearly visible in a majority of Poland’s elites. In
particular, it includes a paternalistic or simply arrogant attitude toward Eastern
neighbours”.96 
Polish self and Ukrainian Other recently
'What are Ukrainians like?' - Perception of the Other in line with past 
discourse
I  argue  that  the  overall  framework  of  Orientalisation  as  reinforcing  the
perception of superiority narration of history, had a profound impact on the
contemporary image of Ukraine in Poland. Tarnavsky was unsurprised by the
way Ukrainians were depicted in With Fire and Sword, seeing that “in a recent
poll  reported  in  the  Ukrainian  press,  Poles  rated  Ukrainians  as  the  most
despised ethnic group”.97 During the decade following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, indeed, Polish public opinion on Ukrainians went from bad to
worse.  Konieczna's thorough poll  of 2001 for the  Polish Institute of Public
Affairs confirms the very negative attitudes in Poland towards Ukraine.98 The
author introduces the report by noting the persistence of historically shaped
views of the Other,  which, as she notes,  are rarely ever based on personal
encounters  but  narratives  retold.99 Konieczna's  proposition  that  there  “is
much reason to assume that  With Fire and Sword continues to shape Polish
views of Ukrainians until present,”100 is an important explicit linkage of the
Orientalist discourse shaping public opinion of today, which other research
on the negative results  failed to observe.  However,  the historically tainted
view on Ukraine remains a singular mention, rather than forming a key point
96 Ibid.
97 Tarnavsky (2000), p. 322.
98 Konieczna, J. (2001) Polska – Ukraina, wzajemny wizerunek: Raport z badań. Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych.
99 Ibid., p. 13.
100 Ibid., p. 12.
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of analysis. 
Konieczna's  findings  of  the  most  common  associations  with  people  and
country show that “Ukrainians are regarded as an intolerant, aggressive and
reckless people”, as well as cruel and vindictive; economically, Ukraine is seen
as a “country of disorder, poverty and backwardness”.101 While most Poles
had  “close  to  no  knowledge”  on  the  political  system  in  Ukraine,102 the
characteristics they came to associate with the country indicate that the most
non-European  associations  were  attributed.  Crucial  in  this  context  is
Konieczna's observation that Ukraine seemed to be regarded, rather than a
nation-state, as a people inhabiting a designated territory.103 Similarly, most
Poles starkly underestimated it both territorially as well as population-wise.104
A further  telling  aspect  of  Konieczna's  research  compared the  image  of  a
Ukrainian's  characteristics  the  Polish  auto-stereotype.  the  most  commonly
attributed characteristics,  religiosity,  proneness to alcohol abuse,  as well  as
hospitality,  are  those  which  Poles,  too,  most  frequently  attributed  to
themselves.105 Konieczna's  comparative analysis  of sympathy,  perception of
proximity to the country versus that towards other nations is very revealing
in light of the discursive practice of the rhetorical unconscious by the many,
which appears to have permeated peoples conceptions: she notes that 
“Poles regard Ukrainians (together with Belarussians and Russians) as an East European
people, to which Poles express the least sympathy. They furthermore have a comparatively
strong perception of difference and distance towards Ukrainians”106 
In  fact,  Ukrainians  were  rated  as  the  least  liked  nation  among  all  eight
others.107 Highest sympathy was expressed for Western European nations, a
circumstance,  as  Konieczna  seems to  imply,  which  could be  explained by
101 Ibid., pp. 7-20.
102 Ibid., p. 19.
103 Ibid., p. 21.
104 Estimates could lie around 4 times below the actual figure, p. 24.
105 Ibid., p. 8.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., p. 28.
21
intensified Polish aspirations towards EU membership.108 While the current
political context is important to consider in terms of discursive positioning in
what is perceived as a crucial moment for the nation, the image of Ukraine in
Polish minds needs to be contextualised in the larger discourse. It is the long
entrenched ethnic markers which acquire a heightened sense of psychological
urgency at a time when a positively distinctive identity becomes all the more
important.109
Contextualising 'Ukrainophilia' of Polish elites
From Fedorowicz's analysis of Polish foreign policy directed Eastwards, it is
evident that  of  all  its  ex-Soviet  neighbours,  the Polish-Ukrainian bond has
been by far the closest throughout the last two decades.110 As noted, Poland
was  the  first  country  to  recognise  Ukrainian  independence,  and  both
countries  early on - in 1992 -  signed an important symbolic  declaration of
mutual commitment to good neighbourly relations, with explicit reference to
“history  and  tradition  as  the  foundation  for  the  renewal  of  Polish  and
Ukrainian relations [ ...as well as] the ethnic and cultural links between the
Polish  and Ukrainian  nations”.111 The  close  bond between  the  two former
presidents Kuchma and Kwasniewski - both in office since the mid-90s - was
regarded  as  a  breakthrough  and beginning  of  a  comprehensive  “strategic
partnership”.112 Brzezinki,  in  the  early  1990s,  enthusiastically  assessed  the
Polish-Ukrainian cooperation as  a  “breath of  fresh air”  in  the region,  and
noted the countries'  joint strategic power in terms of their  capabilities and
108 Ibid., p. 27.
109 As noted above, ethnic markers are not eternally fixed, albeit they do not change rapidly or promptly. Konieczna 
found that the more sympathetic respondents were to Ukrainians, the more they perceived a similarity between 
Poles and Ukrainians. Ibid., p. 29.
110 Fedorowicz, K. (2007) 'National Identity and National Interest in Polish Eastern Policy 1989–2004', Nationalities 
Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol. 35 (3), pp. 537-553.
111  Ibid., p. 539.
112  Szeptycki, A. (2010) 'Polish Ukrainian Relations: From the Success of the “Orange Revolution” to Russia first   
        Policy', The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, Vol. 3, p. 7.
        See also: Fedorowicz (2007), p. 545.
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geopolitical position.113 
According  to  Fedorowicz114 and  Szeptycki,115 Polish  elites'  high  interest  in
Ukraine and the international advocacy of its neighbour could progressively
be  observed  as  Poland  joined  the  NATO  and  EU.116 Indeed,  elites  were
frequently referred to as eagerly engaged in relations with Ukraine. Copsey
observes  that  Poland's  pro-Ukrainian  foreign  policy  today  is,  across  the
country's  political  spectrum,  almost  unconditionally  supported.  He  argues
that this can be explained by 
“the liberals, inheritors of the ideals of the émigré journal Kultura...they can count in their
ranks the overwhelming bulk of the foreign policy community. [...They] fervently believe in
the Polish-Ukrainian strategic alliance as a strengthening force for good in the region”.117 
Founded in 1947, the Paris-based Kultura was issued monthly throughout the
decades  of  communism,  reaching  its  Polish  readership  via  underground
distribution.  Kultura's chief  editor  Giedroyc  is  viewed  as  setting  the
publication's political tone. As Ulanowska points out, he had been convinced
of the eventual breakdown of the Soviet Union, and had appealed for Poles to
sympathise with their neighbours, which, once political transformation was
possible, would become its key partners.118 The writer especially emphasised
the crucial role of Ukraine for Polish Eastern partnership, and stressed the
importance  of  Poland  as  the  Bulwark  against  Russia.119 As  Copsey  notes,
while  Giedroyc was the most  prominent  advocate of  such ideology at  the
time, it was in line with earlier writings such as Baczkowski's, which similarly
113 Brzezinski, I. (1993) 'Polish‐Ukrainian relations: Europe's neglected strategic axis', Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, Vol. 35 (3), p. 26.
114 Fedorowicz (2007), 545. 
115  Szeptycki (2010), p. 7.; 
116 Gniazdowski noted the importance of the Orange Revolution in this respect, as it presented the first significant 
and successful Polish engagement in the EU's foreign policy. 
        Gniazdowski, M. (2006) 'Historical Issues in Polish Foreign Policy in 2005', Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 
(English Edition), Vol. 01, p..250.
117 Copsey, N. (2008) 'Remembrance of Things Past: the Lingering Impact of History on Contemporary Polish–
Ukrainian Relations', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60 (4), p. 10.
118  Ulanowska (2006) 'The Emigre Prince Jerzy Giedroyć on the 100th anniversary of his birth', Polish-American 
Cultural Center JPII.
119 Copsey, N. (2006) 'Echoes of the Past in Contemporary Politics: the case of Polish-Ukrainian Relations', Sussex 
European Institute: Working Paper No 87, p. 4.
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emphasised  the  importance  to  cooperate  with  former  Commonwealth
states.120 
Blacker, similarly to Copsey, established a link between the ideas promoted by
Kultura and Polish foreign policy, referring to Poland's international advocacy
for Ukraine as its self-imposed “mission”.121 Indeed, while in the past, Polish
elites'  attitudes  towards  the  country's  Eastern  neighbour  could  best  be
characterised  as  imperial,  and  domination  was  understood  in  terms  of
Poland's  hard,  military  power,  the  present  strategy  is  determined  by  the
affirmation of  its European identity, hence in need of corresponding means.
Even  prior  to  joining  the  EU,  Poland  had  declared  its  intention  to
considerably shape the Union's foreign policy to the East, which then found
expression  in  the  Eastern  Partnership  (EaP).122 This  way,  as  noted  by
Cianciara,  Poland  attempted  to  integrate  and  legitimise  its  foreign  policy
objectives in the EU framework.123 Klatt views this endeavour precisely as an
illustration of  Polish adoption of  European soft  power,124 in  an attempt to
further export what is understood as European values Eastwards. By doing
so, Poland  instrumentally demarcates itself from this very East, and is able to
manifest its European identity. The Polish identity discourse which bears a
historically  entrenched  missionary  element  as  part  of  the  narrative  of
religiosity and general moral  superiority over the East,  combined with the
revised  mission  promoted  by  Kultura,  are  arguably  the  main  discursive
120  Ibid., referencing Baczkowski (1939).
121 Blacker, U. (2013) 'Prizes and Politics: Poland, the EU and Ukrainian Culture', Ukraine Analysis: Current Politics in
Ukraine, December 5.
      The scholar argues that the liberal elite project of embracing Ukraine as European plays out in the cultural sphere,
too: The fact that a Polish committee granted the 2013 Angelus award for Central European literature to the 
Ukrainian Zabuzhko, whose work Museum of Abandoned Secrets deals with difficult interwar relationship of both 
countries and presents Ukrainian nationalism in a favourable light, is arguably a well-meaning but patronising 
gesture of symbolic acceptance, as opposed to “substantive engagement with that other”. The promotion of the 
Ukrainian viewpoint, according to Blacker, can be seen as the employment of a soft power strategy which is 
“aimed at redefining Ukrainian culture as properly European, which helps steer Ukraine as a state towards the 
EU.”
122  As one particular strand of the overall EU framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which 
Poland had criticised as too Southern-focussed.
123 Cianciara, A. (2008) ' “Eastern Partnership” – opening a new chapter of Polish Eastern policy and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy?', The Institute of Public Affairs: Analyses and Opinions, No. 4, June, p. 1. 
124 Klatt, M. (2011) ‘Poland and its Eastern Neighbours: Foreign Policy Principles’, Journal of Contemporary European 
Research. Volume 7 (1), p. 3.
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influences on the elitist project of Europeanising Ukraine in particular, which
has  been  central  to  the  EaP  throughout.125 Dempsey  interpreted  the
persistently committed Polish Eastern mission as the attempt to “complete the
unfinished revolution in Eastern Europe”.126 This understanding, indeed, is in
line  with  the  discursively  promoted  Polish  understanding  of  the  self  as
defined above. 
As  much  as  Poland's  political  elites  appeared  committed  to  the  country's
Eastern mission by European means,  for the largest  part,  average Poles,  it
must seem, were less enthusiastic. Konieczna's findings indicate that, just over
a decade ago, they certainly did not share sentiments of cultural and ethnic
similarity referenced in the declarations of good-neighbourly relations. 
Poland – Ukraine – Russia: A zero-sum game?
Szeptycki  noted  that  the  overt  Polish  support  for  Ukraine  resulted  in  the
deterioration  of  its  relations  with  Russia.127 Indeed,  the  role  of  Russia  as
Poland's  “natural  adversary  in  the  region  [of  Eastern  Europe]”  was
acknowledged even in the first document proposing a comprehensive Eastern
Partnership.128 When  scholars  and  policy-makers  emphasise  that  an
independent, democratic Ukraine is in the Polish national interest,129 Russia
with its, as stated, “imperial ambitions”130 often seems to loom large. For both
countries  a  zero-sum game is  implied,  in  which  Poland and Ukraine  can
choose to either cooperate with one another, or with Russia instead. Szeptycki
regretted that Polish-Ukrainian political  and economic cooperation did not
further intensify following the Orange Revolution,131 one reason, as he notes,
125  Ciancara (2008), p. 5.
126 Dempsey, J. (2014) 'Poland's unfinished revolution in Eastern Europe', Carnegie Europe,  February 27.
127 Szeptycki (2010), p. 10.
128  Cianciara (2008), p. 5.
129 Szeptycki (2010), p. 25.; Gniazdowski (2006), p. 248.
130 Szeptycki (2010), p. 6. 
131  A number of scholars investigated to what extent the troublesome periods of the countries' 20th-century history, 
such as the Polish-Ukrainian war following WWI, as well as the massacre of the Polish minority in Volhynia in 
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being the  prioritisation of  Russia  in  Polish foreign policy  at  the  time.132 A
study  of  Ukrainian  journalists'  opinions  on  Poland  similarly  found  them
disappointed  in  such  perceived  stagnation,  which  was  attributed  to
Yanukovych's  'Russia-first'  policy.133 Fomina's  and  Ryabinska's  study  reads
like an argumentation, that, in this zero-sum game, Ukraine would be better
off choosing Poland. A critical analysis must prompt the question whether the
findings of the survey, too, might be informed by the discourse of the Polish
self-understanding, and thus overemphasise Ukrainian associations of Poland
to equal with progress. Fomina and Ryabinska's report details, in great length,
the journalists' accounts on Poland as a historic gateway to Europe, it being a
role model to Ukraine in many respects.134 While this enthusiastic view seems
to contradict the study's findings that Ukrainian media generally do not cover
Poland at all, the report further suggests this was largely due to the fact that
the country is a safe and quiet place.135
In  general,  the  national-conservative  PiS  [Law  and  Justice]  party,  lead  by
Jaroslaw Kaczynski, positions itself strongly against Russia, while the liberal-
conservative PO [Citizens' Platform] - currently in government - is considered
to  take  a  more  pragmatic  stance  and  has,  in  recent  years,  attempted  to
improve Polish-Russian relations, which was heavily criticised by the former.
1943, impacted upon Polish-Ukrainian relations. Gniazdowski argued that while the re-opnening of the Lviv's 
Eaglets cemetery – where Polish soldiers who fell in the 1918-19 war were buried - was a sensitive matter, the 
demonstration of good will by the most significant actors, as he notes, meant that history did not become an 
obstacle to good relations. Gniazodwki (2006), p. 249. As the scholar further notes, this contrasted with relations 
of  Poland with other neighbour states, where disputes over the interpretation of history turned out more 
protracted.
       Copsey's findings confirm Gniazdowski's rather positive assessment. While he notes that, over remembrance and
anniversaries, it might have appeared as if history posed a substantial problem to Ukrainian-Polish relations, his 
analysis showed that politicians de facto acted very pragmatically, and only fringe groups – with very limited 
public influence – temporarily succeeded in making their claims be heard loudest. Copsey (2006).
       While Kasianov's assessment paints is more pessimistic in its assessment of the ways in which history impacted 
upon the countries' relations, it appears that his research might be a momentary insight, as relations can not be 
seen as affected by these issues in the long term.
132  Szeptycki (2010), p. 16.
133 Fomina; Ryabinska (2011), p. 12. 
134 Fomina J.; Ryabinska, N. (2011) Po drugiej stronie lustra Obraz Polski w ukrainskich mediach. Warsaw: Instytut Spraw
Publicznych, pp. 5-46.
135 Ibid., p. 14.
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During the Ukraine crisis, PO similarly positioned itself discursively firmly
anti-Russian.  This  way,  all  crucial  elements  of  the  Polish  national  identity
discourse  as  well  as  elites'  conception  of  the  revised  Eastern  mission
presented a particular moment for identification which lead to exceptional





In  the first  section of  this  paper,  I  attempted to  line out  how the identity
discourse of the self and Other in Poland came to be shaped through selective
narration of the Polish past. As noted at the outset, Levintova as well as Hopf
hold  that  national  identity  discourse  informs  the  image  of  the  Other  in
people's minds and furthermore foreign policy objectives. While opinions on
Ukraine  in  Poland  were  until  recently  arguably  strongly  shaped  by  the
selective  history  narration  that  positively  distinctive  national  identification
requires, Polish foreign policy was found to be attached to a revised mission
that embraced the cooperation with Ukraine as a way of affirming European
identity as defined by its soft power.
At  present,  the media can be regarded as  “the principal  institution of  the
public sphere”.136 Especially for relatively suddenly occurring events which
people  do  not  experience  directly,  the  media  have  a  central  role  in
communicating, and thus shaping the discourse.  They constitute the major
feed of knowledge which becomes the basis for further communication and
136 Curran, J. (1997) 'Press History', in Power Without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain: Press 
and Broadcasting in Britain; Curran, J; Seaton, J. (eds.). London, New York: Routledge, p.29.
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dissemination of narratives.137 As was found, indeed,  the majority of  Poles
derive their images of the Other from mass media,138 and Konieczna's study
confirms this with regards to Ukraine in particular.139 Her report especially
mentions Rzeczpospolita (RP) and Gazeta Wyborcza (GW) as papers which try to
accommodate the rising interest in Ukrainian affairs by offering coverage on a
range of issues on the country in multiple sections.140 This study, too, for an
analysis  of  Polish  newspapers,  will  focus  on  these  papers.  They  remain
among  the  most  widely  read  in  the  country:  recent  figures  suggest  a
circulation  of  around  185,000  for  Gazeta  Wyborcza,  and  63,000  for
Rzeczpospolita.  While sales  have been declining for both papers over recent
years,141 this does not necessarily have to suggest a drop in readership, as the
newspapers' websites are widely used. What is more, both papers remain the
two most cited national sources in the country,142 a fact that confirms their
status as most trusted sources of information and illustrates their influential
position with regards to shaping the representation of events in the country. 
The analysis of coverage from  RP and  GW represents that from across the
general  “ideological  spectrum  of  the  Polish  mainstream  media”:143
Rzeczpospolita is firmly rooted in the Christian national tradition, a reason that
led to its decade-long ban during communism. The paper has a conservative
profile and “close ties to Law and Justice”.144 Gazeta Wyborcza,  on the other
hand, is  regarded  as  a  liberal  publication.  In  allegiance  to  Solidarność
137  Moscovici, a leading scholar in social representations studies, described their function as serving firstly people's 
orientation in the “material and social world; secondly, to enabe communication”. Moscovici,(1973), in  'Social 
Representations Theory' (2013), Changing Minds.org.
       While social representation studies are more concerned with the ways in which repreentations, meanings 
ascribed to events, are received and further communicated, the starting point of the scholarship helps to illustrate
the importance of the key institution of discourse, the media, which are the primary medium.
138 Levintova (2010), p. 1356, referencing Sobczak; Orlowski (2006).
139 Around 72% of Polish adults reported exposure to such coverage. Konieczna (2001), p. 22.
140  Ibid., p. 17.
141 ' "Gazeta Wyborcza" i "Gazeta Polska Codziennie" z największym spadkiem sprzedaży (2013) TVN 24.
142 ' "Wyborcza" najczęściej cytowanym dziennikiem w 2013 roku. Wśród tygodników prowadzi "Wprost" '(2014) 
Gazeta Wyborcza.
143  Levintova (2010), p. 1344.
144 'Rzeczpospolita' (2014), Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 
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[Solidarity],145 it  emerged  as  the  first  independent  paper  in  Poland;146
presently, its political sympathies lie with the PO. As Levintova holds in terms
of  media  analysis,  the  newspaper  format  allows  for  a  more  systematic
discursive analysis by the way in which a number of articles form one longer
narrative of complementing stories and feedbacks.147
Search engines on the websites of both papers formed the starting point of the
research to identify relevant articles for  Gazeta Wyborcza and  Rzeczpospolita:
the keyword 'Ukraine' was entered on 19 March, 2014. For both RP and GW, a
number of 150 articles was first considered. Excluded were repetitions, minor,
very short  pieces,  as  well  as  articles  marked as “[RELACJA]” for  RZ,  and
“RELACJA NA ZYWO” for  GW - live  reports  on  recent  developments  in
Ukraine, due to the peculiar style of news-telling of this format. As the search
results  included  articles  from  various  sections  of  the  paper,  domestic,
international,  and opinion,  the research will  follow this  random setting in
order to give a very rough, cross-cutting picture of the framing adopted in the
paper overall.  In addition, articles were considered which were interlinked
with those prompted by search engines.  A number of 63 articles was finally
analysed  for  Rzeczpospolita,  and 67  for  Gazeta  Wyborcza. The  researcher
attempted  to  identify  articles  from  across  the  time-frame  of  interest,
beginning  in  late  November  2013  with  the  escalation  of  the  protests,  and
ending  in  mid  March  2014  with  mounting  unrests  surrounding  the
referendum  in  Crimea.  However,  in  correspondence  with  erratic
developments of the crisis, coverage was not evenly distributed; furthermore,
certain key events such as the negotiations between Yanukovych and the EU's
foreign ministers under the participation of Sikorski on 21 February present
145  The first independent self-organised body allowed – and then banned, due to its extremely high popularity– in 
the Soviet Union, formed in 1980. Working underground for years after, it eventually  co-shaped Poland's post-
Communist future in the round-table agreements of 1989. Solidarity bears high symbolic value for Poland until 
present, which will become evident in the analysis below.
146 'Gazeta Wyborcza' (2014), Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
147  Levintova (2010), p. 1344.
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revealing discursive events of Polish national identity.
The study of news agencies and press releases in the context of news framing
lies beyond the scope of this paper.
Methodological approach to data
This study is interested in how far the pre-existing context, the discourse on
the Polish self and Other as defined in the paper's first section, is visible in
media representation of the Ukraine crisis. A critical approach, as noted at the
outset  of  this  study,  seeks to  interrogate the currants  of  the pre-conceived
understanding  which  informs  the  perpetual  practice  of  such  unconscious
rhetoric. In order to comprehend the present dimensions of the Polish identity
discourse, news texts were analysed and categorised according to the way in
which  they  depicted  the  events.  In  this  way,  recurrent  frames  of
representations were identified. Frames, according to Hervik, precisely form
“the discursive cues […] used to evoke, or align, its message with certain pre-
existing  understandings”.148 Entmann  furthermore  defined  framing  as  a
selective  process,  always  suggestive  of  a  particular  “definition,  causal
interpretation,  moral  evaluation,  and/or  treatment  recommendation for the
item  described”.149 Such  selection,  as  is  argued  here,  occurs  through  the
process of the rhetorical unconscious, which automatises the understanding
of  new  contexts  according  to  past  representations.  The  consideration  of
intertextuality is crucial in this respect: news texts cannot be seen as singular,
but  as  serially  connected  in  reaction  and  reference  to  one  another,  thus
forming  a  narrative.150 Such  intertextuality  is  genre-bound,  as  Fairclough
points out with reference to Bakhtin's writings, as texts of a genre are exposed
148  Hervik, P. (2011) 'Discourse and Frame Analysis: Methodological Implications for Qualitative Research based on 
the examples from the Danish Media Coverage of Ethnic and Religious Minorities', Summer school: Qualitative 
Methods, 26 August.
149  Entmann, R. (1993), p. 52. in Hervik (2011).
150 Titscher, S. Meyer, M; Wodak, R. Vetter, p.146, referencing Kristeva (Moi, 1986).
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to its particular constraints.151 The dissection of different but recurring frames
of  news  stories  will  shed  light  on  the  overall  discourse,  which  can  be
contextualised  with  the  “pre-existing  understanding”.152 The  nature  of  the
intensive  engagement  with  news items identified  through this  method,  as
Maneria and ter Wal note, necessarily puts restrictions on the size of the data
set; the recurrence of a certain mode of discourse, though, can be observed
through some quantification,153 and,  indeed,  this  is  will  be of  key interest.
This  paper,  due  to  the  nature  of  the  events  studied  which  were  rapidly
evolving as well as stretched out over a period of time, attempted to do justice
to its project by choosing the following procedure: firstly, the articles were
studied and categorised according to recurring frames of representation, in
order  to  appreciate  the  overall  discourse  in  contextualising  the  different
frames  identified  together.  In  a  second  step,  a  deeper  investigation  of  a
selection  of  articles  will  reveal  certain  discursive  representational
mechanisms, with particular emphasis on the underlying assumptions which
arguably  can  be  contextualised  with  preformed  understanding  of  Polish
identity discourse. An in-depth linguistic analysis of the sentence-level cannot
be  undertaken,  as  this  study  attempts  to  shed  light  on  larger,  repetitive
discursive frames as  events  of  interest  unfold;  it  focusses  instead on tools
considered  “global”.154 Thus,  paradigm  for  the  dissection  of  frames  is  to
identify  implicit and explicit argumentation of the news text in consideration
of such global, discursive elements as established by Maneri and ter Wal, as
well as Tankard:155 a very significant indication for a frame is the chosen topic
of  a  news  item,  and  its  headline  as  setting  the  tone  of  the  article;  the
organisational  structure  of  the  text  including  subheadings,  pictures  and
151  Fairclough defined a genre as bearing its characteristic, as if automatised use of language in "a socially ratified 
way...in connection with a particular type of social activity". Fairclough, N. (1995).Critical Discourse Analysis. Boston: 
Addison Wesley, p. 14.
152  Entmann (1993), p. 52. in Hervik (2011).
153  Maneri ; ter Wal (2005).
154  Maneri; ter Wal (2005), referencing Van Dijk (1988ab), (1991).
155 Tankard, J. W. (2001). 'The empirical approach to the study of media framing'. In S. D. Reese; O. H. Gandy; A. E. 
Grant (Eds.), Framing public life (pp. 95–106). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, p. 101.
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videos included will furthermore be important.156 A further very significant
clue for the discursive analysis, moreover, is the authorisation of speech for
certain actors,  through interviews or quotation patterns.157 This  reveals  not
only the  implicitly  accepted status  and level  of  knowledge of  the  speaker
assumed to be of interest to the public; it represents a choice of discursive
positioning towards an issue by not letting someone else speak. The style of
narration constitutes a further indicator for the frame adopted. This concerns
both the order in which information is presented, as well as any particular
style of story-telling, such as scene-setting or inclusion of dramatic elements. 
The  study  of  frames  chosen  for  news  coverage  needs  to  consider  which
possible narratives were excluded. One crucial aspect will be the assessment
of Polish leadership during the crisis. The fact that, as will be shown, it has
been assessed favourably, reveals the persistent mechanisms of the rhetorical
unconscious which  invite  a  politically  patriotic  framing of  events.  Indeed,
assumptions  of  Polishness  according  to  the  above  defined  discourse  in
combination  with  the  revised  Polish  Eastern  mission  will  be  shown  as




The table below illustrates the larger frames of representation identified for
RP- articles. As the length of the period studied does not allow to detail  all
articles  per  date,  coverage  was  summarised  in  a  way  so  as  to  broadly
correspond to  events  occurring at  the time,  and summarising time frames
where  articles  either  covered  the  same  event,  or  where  the  stalling  of
156 Although only Gazeta Wyborcza utilises such visual elements in a way as to significantly underscore the 
argumentation of the article.
157 Maneri; ter Wal (2005), referencing Zelizer (1989); Van Dijk (1988b).
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developments in Ukraine led to less and miscellaneous coverage. 
























1 1 4 1 7
05/12/13 1 3 4
06 – 09/12/13 1 2 3
12 – 16/12/13 3 3
19/12/13 5 5
20/01/14 1 3 4
27 – 29/01/14 1 1 2
05/02/14 1 1
10/02/14 1 1 2
19/02/14 1 1
21/02/14 1 5 1 7
22 – 26/02/14 1 4 2 7
27/02/14 1 1 3 5
02 – 07/03/14 1 2 4 7
09 - 10/03/14 1 1 2
15 – 19/03/14 1 1 1 3
Total 63
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As noted above, Rzeczpospolita, as a Christian-conservative paper, is generally
regarded as rather critical of the government in power. An analysis of the
types  of  discursive  frames  adopted  for  narrating  the  events  in  Ukraine
between  late  November  and  mid  March,  however,  revealed  a  markedly
pleased assessment of the leadership. Polish diplomacy, headed by the foreign
minister Sikorski,158 as will be shown, is represented as playing a positively
crucial role in the crisis.159 The articles which expressed criticism did so with
respect  to  a  lack  of  further action  in  supporting  what  was  regarded  pro-
democratic, pro-European movement in Ukraine. As is evident from the table,
the  positive  assessment  of  Polish  political  leadership  peaked  over  the
negotiations  with  Yanukovych  on  21  February.  Similarly,  analysis  of  the
framing  of  Sikorski's  meeting  with  the  Russian  foreign  minister  Sergey
Lavrov on 19 December, narrated in an overall discourse of Polish-Russian
fundamental difference, reveals pride in the former as adopting a firm stance
against his Russian counterpart. The criticism of the EU's lack of support for
Ukraine tends to be framed in a way that Poland should intensify efforts to
convince its fellow EU members of the right course of action, resting on the
assumption  of  Polish  expertise;  this  reveals  frustration  with  a  hampered
pursuit  of  the  Eastern  mission.  Criticism  directed  at  the  government  for
failing to do more,  as  will  be shown through an intertextual  position that
treats news texts as interdependent, reveals that the same is outweighed by
subsequent coverage which appears more persuasive.
158  The popularity of the PO-aligned Sikorski, as will be shown, indeed appears to have grown considerably, as his 
diplomatic endeavours were domestically and internationally recognised. Sikorski, having studied in Oxford and
worked in Washington for several years, is one of not many Polish politicians with an international background, 
and his 'European profile' is pointed out by media coverage in some instances; thus, by extension, Sikroski 
appears to affirm Polish European identity.
159 This, notably, contrasts with in an article assessing governmental achievements halfway through term when 
Sikorski's accomplishments were rated as “sufficient” only. The reason, however, was his alleged ambitions for 
international office. 
       Autorzy Rzeczpospolitej (2013, 19 December) 'Ranking ministrów Donalda Tuska', Rzeczpospolita.
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Exemplification of rhetorically practised political patriotism
Polish diplomacy as sensible and well informed, universally recognised as such
One  of  the  earliest  articles  in  the  dataset  is  an  interview with  the  Polish
foreign minister, titled “Sikorski for Rz: Ukraine as a lesson to Eurosceptics at
home”.160 The heading serves as a reminder of the Polish past and affirmation
of  having  followed  the  correct,  European  path,  while  simultaneously
affirming the foreign minister's  expertise on wider issues of economic and
social transformation of Central and Eastern Europe.161 Sikorski's position in
the  interview  remains  unchallenged,  as  he  elaborates  on  Poland's
determination  to  return  to  Europe  following the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet
Union,  and  expresses  sympathy  for  Ukrainian  protests,  while  demanding
reforms. 
An interview with the esteemed ex-president Aleksander Kwasniewski at the
beginning  of  December  credits  Polish  diplomacy  in  relation  to  Ukraine.162
While the crisis  constituted one of several  topics covered in the interview,
considering  intertextuality,  it  reads  as  a  response  to  an  earlier  published
comment by Kaczynski, who criticised the lack of governmental presence on
the Maidan square at the end of November.163 Kwasniewski's point that such
presence  would  breach  general  rules  of  diplomatic  conduct  remains
unchallenged and thus has a persuasive effect. 
Affirmation of the importance of Poland in the EU and recognised as such by
its European allies - with particular emphasis on  Germany - was visible in an
article dated 19 December, titled “Germany and Poland speak with one voice
160 Talaga, A.; Bielecki, J. (2013, 27 November) 'Sikorski dla "Rz": Ukraina nauczką dla rodzimych eurosceptyków', 
Rzeczpospolita.
161  A similar affirmation of Sikorski's status is repeated in an article in which the foreign minister is presented as a 
key actor in the EU, and explains the specifics of the Union's proposal to Ukraine.
      'Sikorski: oferta UE dla Ukrainy pozostaje na stole', (2013, 12 December) Rczeczpospolita. 
162  Bielecki, J. 'Oligarchowie stawiają na Europę' (2013, 03 December)
163 'Kaczyński w Kijowie: wspieramy europejskie dążenia Ukrainy' (2013, 01 December), Rzeczpospolita.
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on  Ukraine”.164 The  argumentation,  with  the  German  foreign  minister
reportedly  meeting  Sikorski,  proceeds  to  inform  that  Steinmeier  had
“changed his mind”, and further, that Berlin “trusts Warsaw more and more
on Eastern foreign policy”,  suggest  that  Polish expertise  is  persuasive.  An
article sympathising with the protesters on Maidan square as tensions rose in
mid-February,  describes  Sikorski  deliberating  with  EU  partners  on  this,
noting in a similar vein that “Brussels is beginning to listen more and more
attentively to the Polish voice”.165
A very  notable  moment  of  the  practice  of  the  rhetorical  unconscious  of
political  patriotism,  as  was  indicated  above,  could  be  observed  in  the
coverage of EU-foreign ministers' negotiations with Yanukovych, 21 February.
Considered  an  extraordinary  success,  the  event  presented  a  moment  of
Poland's positive distinctiveness, and critical coverage remained absent. The
titles of articles covering the negotiations give indicative cues of the high level
of  trust  to  Polish  diplomacy.  Quoting  the  Polish  MEP Prostasiewicz,  one
article  titles  “If  the agreement  works out,  Sikorski  should be awarded the
Nobel peace prize”,166 finding no objection to his statement. Several articles
displayed awe for the foreign minister in making the impossible happen. This
is reflected in titles such as “The diplomatic maneuver of Kiev”,167 as well as
simply “Apocalypse”.168 The latter article uses very literary, emotive language
in visualising the battle scenes, starting off with describing how “Yanukovych
is bathing Maidan in blood”, after which the reader is taken to the setting of
diplomatic negotiations, which are described in a manner suggestive of an
emergency operation:  “The feverish diplomatic treatments and talks lasted
the  whole  day”.  Another  article  expresses  sympathy  for  the  protesters'
164 Jendroszczyk, P. (-2013, 19 December) 'Niemcy i Polska mówią jednym głosem w sprawie Ukrainy', 
Rzeczpospolita. 
165 Piechal, T.; Giziński, J. (2014,19 February) 'Majdan się nie poddaje', Rzeczpospolita.
166 'Protasiewicz: Jeśli porozumienie zadziała, Sikorskiemu należy się Nobel' (2014, 21 February), Rzeczpospolita.
167 Słojewska, A. (2014, 21 February) 'Kijowski manewr dyplomatyczny', Rzeczpospolita.
168 Giziński, J. Piechal, T. (2014, 21 February) 'Apokalipsa', Rzeczpospolita.
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scepticism of the agreement,  while referring to the same as the result  of a
“marathon”, the “maximum of what could have been achieved”.169 The article
which  served  as  an  introduction  to  this  paper,  titling  “Great  symbols  of
Ukraine”,  simultaneously  moves  the  country  discursively  Westwards  by
calling it “the most important place in Europe”, after which it Orientalises
Ukrainians in admiring their un-European passion “who at all in the West
would hold out protesting for months any more?”.170 The article proceeds to
suggest the protests to be a “symbol of unification”, notably excluding the
possibility of Ukrainians not sharing a unequivocal stance on closer ties to the
EU. The author furthermore sees.  A more assertive affirmation of Poland's
achievements  in  the  crisis,  in  holding  up  the  “awakening  of  Polish
diplomacy”, as fostering  the highest “ sense of pride” in a long time, could
hardly be possible.171 
The  unequivocally  enthusiastic  assessment  of  Polish  diplomacy  is
complemented  by  an  article  covering  an  opinion  poll  conducted  for  RP,
published shortly after the negotiations. It illustrates citizens' approval of the
Polish “diplomatic mission”:172 “The majority (71%) had a positive opinion
[...]. Only every fifth respondent was critical”. Respondents were said to be
divided  over  the  question  whether  the  government  should  intensify  its
efforts, with 43% considering them adequate, while 40% thought more should
be done. The article proceeds to describe pro-Ukrainian protest marches in a
number  of  Polish  cities,  after  which  it  appears  critical  of  PiS'  negative
comments  on  the  government,  following  the  party's  earlier  vow  to  back
governmentally-led foreign policy. The article ends with the direct quotation
of a Polish political scientist, who argues that the renewed dissent of PiS can
169 Giziński, J. (2014, 21 February) 'Sukces dyplomatów nie zadowala Majdanu', Rzeczpospolita.
170 Haszczyński, J. (2014, 21 February) 'Wielkie symbole Ukrainy', Rzeczpospolita. 
171 A similar article titled “Maidan does not trust anyone”, details the desperate situation of a protester, whose 
brother chose to sympathise with Russia and tore the family apart, expresses  understanding of protesters' 
confusion, and their failure to recognise the agreement with Yanukovych as the “real earthquake” that it was.
      Piechal (2014, 22 February) 'Majdan nie ufa nikomu', Rzeczpospolita. 
172 Ćwiek,K. (2014, 24 February) 'Dobra ocena dyplomacji', Rzeczpospolita.
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be explained by their  need to rhetorically distinguish themselves  for  their
electorate, and the argument has the effect of de-legitimising the dissent. In
this instance, RP appears to be willing to deviate from the party allegiance for
what is implicitly accepted as the higher good: solidarity for Ukraine in unity
of  the  Polish  party  spectrum are  presupposed  as  desirable  and  beneficial
domestically  and  internationally,  and  the  absence  of  the  same  results  in
criticism towards those dissenting.  The practice of the rhetorical unconscious
of Polish identity, as is argued, can help contextualise such framing. While an
article published in late February details PiS'  antagonistic efforts as,  titled,
“Total war – so business as usual”, it ends on the note “heavily wounded was
only  one  victim:  the  Republic  of  Poland”.173 Again,  disunity  is  framed  as
highly damaging without the provision of reasons why it would have such
detrimental consequences.
The Polish leadership is furthermore reported as receiving universal approval
through  utilisation  of  speakers.  An  Ukrainian  ambassador,  who  evidently
presents an expert opinion,174 is cited as acknowledging the successful “multi-
level engagement of Poland”, singling out Sikorski's merit in particular. The
importance of Polish efforts over those of other foreign ministers which were
involved, is in line with the discourse that Poland has a key role to play in
Ukraine's fate, and is the country's only reliable advocate in Europe. 
The recognition of Polish engagement for Ukraine jointly with the narrative of
its  relevance  as  representative  of  the  Western  value  community,  is  further
visible in RP-articles published at the end of February, covering the session of
the Polish National Security Council, as well as Sikorski's meeting with the
American foreign minister.  Early in the article,  the foreign ministry's press
release is quoted that “Kerry thanked the minister for his engagement in the
peace process”.175 The recognition of Poland as a highly significant party in
173 Górzyński, O. (2014, 25 February) 'Wojna totalna, czyli wszystko wraca do normy', Rzeczpospolita. 
174 'Ambasador Ukrainy: Nie można nazwać walki o wolność zamachem stanu' (2014, 25 February), Rzeczpospolita.
175 'Sikorski z sekretarzem stanu USA o Ukrainie i Iranie' (2014, 27 February), Rzeczpospolita.
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this  “peace  process”  is,  indeed,  exhausted  in  almost  any  thinkable  way:
coverage on the situation of the Tatars in Crimea is titled as them “pleading
for Polish help”,176 and Polish efforts for the EaP are furthermore seen as the
reason for why protests broke out in late November, as they instilled “the
vision of European integration” in Ukrainians' minds.177 Telling in this context
is  an interview with  Tyahnybok,  the leader of  the controversial nationalist
party Svoboda.178 The title of the interview “We are immensly grateful to Poles
for their support”, is indicative of the friendly, conciliatory tone of the article.
Rather than facing critical questions on the party's ideology and agenda,179
Tyahnybok is encouraged to elaborate on his personal views on Poland: the
entire second page of the interview details the relations of the two countries,
which he holds as “neighbours,  brotherly nations” despite  past  hardships.
Thus,  as  it  is  evident  from  the  newspaper  coverage  included  for
Rzeczpospolita, Polish diplomacy has been portrayed as universally acclaimed
– in political unity domestically, supported by Polish citizens as reflected in
opinion polls cited, by Ukrainian diplomats and regular citizens, and lastly by
its EU-partners, and other Western allies, the United States.
The Polish voice in the EU as remedy for the Union's past mistakes
While Poland at times is narrated as an exemplary European actor,  in  RP-
articles which appealed to intensify European efforts, Polish engagement was
presented as the only promising solution: in late February, an article titled “all
the  sins  of  Europe”  lists  the  community's  failures  to  take  pro-Ukrainian
176 'Lipiński: Tatarzy krymscy apelują do Polski o pomoc'(2014, 27 February), Rzeczpospolita. 
177 Bielecki, J. (2014, 27 February) 'Unia może zatrzymać Rosję', Rzeczpospolita.
178 Chrabota, B. (2014, 07 March) 'Jesteśmy niezmiernie wdzięczni Polakom za wsparcie', Rzeczpospolita. 
179 This is only dealt with in the questions as to whether Tyahnybok supports European integration, which he said 
the party “always supported”, and on the Pravy Sektor, to which the party leader can comfortably respond that 
these are the radicals. 
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agency in the past.180 A “more active Poland”, as the last subheading reads,
would  alleviate  this,  provided  the  country  would  “recognise  this  historic
moment and sets the tone”. Poland's depiction as simultaneously European
and  as  expert  on  “the  East”,  through  the  advocacy  for  which  it  can
demonstrate its Europeanness, is very much in line with the Polish national
identity  discourse.  Disappointment  was  expressed in  Polish leadership  for
failing  to  stronger  advocate  Ukraine  in  the  EU  setting,  as  its  prioritising
Moldova  over  Ukraine  in  EU  re-negotiations  of  the  EaP.181 However,  in
consideration of intertextuality, this position was arguably balanced out by a
longer and more comprehensive article which regarded the lack of mention of
Ukraine as it being a special case and hence in need of “separate politics”.182
Poland as Europe – Russia as Orient
Very early in the crisis, an article dated 27 November positions Poland against
Russia in its race for Ukraine as linguistically staged on lively Maidan square,
and the heading indicates who allegedly was the winner of this battle for the
hearts and minds: “On Maidan, they praise Poland and criticise Russia”.183
The article starts with emphasising Ukrainian recognition of Polish “success”
and Russia as “blocking progress”, a narrative very much in line with the
Polish historically formed understanding of the self.  The article details the
numerous presence of Poles on Maidan which, as in the words of a young
Pole interviewed, is “overwhelmingly positively” received by Ukrainians; this
is literary exemplified by their outcries of “thank you” and their singing of the
Polish national anthem.184 
180 Wapiński, M.; Kowal, P. (2014, 24 February) 'Wszystkie grzechy Europy', Rzeczpospolita.
181 Słojewska, A. (2014,10 February) 'Więcej wsparcia Unii Europejskiej dla Mołdawii', Rzeczpospolita.
182 Słojewska, A. (2014, 10 February) 'Na ratunek Partnerstwu', Rzeczpospolita.
183 'Na Majdanie chwalą Polskę, krytykują Rosję' (2013, 27 November)', Reczpospolita. 
184  The frame of Ukrainians' appreciation of Polish agency for the country is recurrent, as exemplified by an article 
from 05 February, which lists the most accomplished politicians for the Ukrainian cause. 'Polacy zdominowali 
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Further  framing  built  around  the  contrasting  of  Poland  and  Russia  as
antithetic in every respect, was visible in coverage of the countries' foreign
ministers'  meeting  in  mid-December.  One  article's  literary  setting  is
suggestive  of  a  boxing  match,  in  which,  from  the  outset,  Sikorski  is
constructed as superior.  His quotation, “Poland and Russia are divided by
their  philosophy on  action”,  reads  as  a  bold  confrontation  to  the  Russian
counterpart.185 Lavrov's allegedly defensive position is dwelt upon, and the
article  concludes  by  contextualising  the  lack  of  Russian  forcefulness,  and,
indeed, its bid for cooperation, as proof of that “the Kreml understood the
strengthened Polish position in the EU”. Another article covering the meeting
titles  tellingly  “Russia  gives  us  Ukraine  as  a  present”,186 and  sets  out  by
suggesting  that  Russia  “admitted  its  defeat”.  Subheadings  narrating  that
“Poland can no longer be isolated” stylistically support the discourse of the
country's  strength.  One  article  lauds  the  currently  firm  stance  of  the
government against Russia, while the reminder is issued that Poland should
never again forget that, as is titled, there are “Two Worlds: Russia is in the
second one”.187 Such extreme discursive distancing against Russia exemplifies
Oriental discourse in similar ways of the narratives defined in section one.
With  the  beginning  of  March  and  the  Duma  approving  Russian  military
presence in Ukraine, the focus of the articles of in this study turns to Russia,
and  Ukraine  as  instrumental  to  the  same.  A representative  piece  is  titled
“Europe can stop Russia”, and ends by appealing to European action against
“Putin's imperial ambitions”, which might even transform “the authoritarian
regime he constructed”.188 In RP coverage as analysed in the sample, Russia's
role in the region is never contextualised with de facto economic dependence
listę najlepszych na świecie lobbystów Ukrainy' (2014, 05 February) Rzeczpospolita.
185 Bielecki, J. (2013, 19 December) 'Sikorski – Ławrow na chłodno, Rzeczpospolita.  
186 Bielecki, J. (2013, 19 December) 'Kreml daruje nam Ukrainę', Rzeczpospolita.
187 Haszczyński, J. (2013, 19 December) 'Dwa światy. W drugim Rosja', Rzeczpospolita.
188 Bielecki, J. (2014, 27 February) 'Unia może zatrzymać Rosję', Rzeczpospolita.
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of  Ukraine  on  the  former.  Rather,  grand  narratives  on  Russia  are
commonplace, which appear to blindly reverberate the Oriental discourse on
the country in a rhetorical practice of patriotism. This is well illustrated in the
“Duet: Russia and Ukraine”,189 where two Polish MPs present their views on
the crisis. The West and Russia, in the words of PO-member Zaleski, pose a
“clash of two divergent conceptions of progress-building: Russia tied itself to
the archaic idea of territorial vastness”, while Europe appears as a “magnet,
luring  with  attractive  values  and  an  open  way  of  organising  society”;
furthermore, the “pro-Western choice of our neighbour [...] first and foremost
symbolises the failure of the authoritarian model”. The question remains why
such  unitary  Ukrainian  pro-European  choice  is  presupposed  in  light  of
increasingly visible dissent in Eastern parts  of Ukraine against  the interim
government in Kiev at the time. Rather than offering substantial analysis on
the reality for Ukrainians on the ground - East and West in the country -, a
tendency to frame the protests in Ukraine according to own experiences of the
past is visible. Waszczykowski, the second MP positioning itself to the crisis,
has an even more radical stance on Russia. He sets out by arguing that the
government  should never have considered closer  cooperation with Russia,
and that  the Eurasian Union “can only  be implemented with tanks”,  thus
reducing Russia to military aggression. Both views appear, rather than being
an analysis of the concrete situation in Crimea or its contextualisation, as a
reverberation of historic discourse on Russia. While consensus among Polish
political parties and media appears to be that of Russia “never taking Ukraine
seriously as a nation of its own”,190 the strongly pro-European frames must
prompt  the  question  as  to  what  extent  this  projects  own  narratives  onto
Ukraine. 
Other  Orientalist  coverage  reads  as  scare  message,  detailing  a  Polish
189 Waszczykowski, W.; Zalewski, P. (2014, 02 March) 'Dwugłos: Rosja a Ukraina', Rzeczpospolita. 
190  Ibid.
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cardinal's appeal to “pray for Ukraine”, where the author proceeds to detail
the  decision of  a  leading member  of  the  Russian-Polish forum of  citizens'
dialogue  to  leave  for  moral  reasons.191 An  interview  with  a  high-ranking
Polish  general  starts  with  concerned  author's  question  whether  “Russia
declared war on Ukraine”,192 to which the general responds “Not yet. Putin
did not make such a decision just yet”, implying that it should nevertheless be
expected very soon. In coverage of an extraordinary session of the parliament,
Poland's readiness to impose “tough sanctions” on Russia is stressed – in the
title -,  as well  as the unitary stance of all  parties  behind the government's
actions  in  this  respect.193 An  interview  with  PiS-member  Brudziński
emphasises his party position. It  revolves around questions of the Russian
threat, and “for whom Putin now poses a problem”;194 the MP responds that
all ex-members of the Eastern block should feel threatened. He proceeds to
expand  –  in  line  with  the  party  position  –  on  the  ex-president  Lech
Kaczynski's “realistic assessment of Russian politics,” arguing that the “naive
notion” should be abandoned that “we, after the Soviet empire, now live in a
safe world”. The latter comment appears to be directed at the government in
office. The interviewer encourages Brudzinski to elaborate on the mistakes of
Polish  leadership  in  this  respect,  which  has  the  effect  of  solidifying  the
absurdity  of  the  idea  that  Russia  could  be  seen  as  anything  else  than an
aggressor.195 References  to  Russia,  however,  are  missing  any  current
contextualisation, and continue to be made on a basis preconceived ideas on
the true character of Russia. A deeper investigation as to what precisely is
occurring with regards to Russian military presence in Crimea is not offered
by any article in the sample; instead, it appears that numerous principles and
references to the past serve as basis for inferences on future scenarios.  An
191 'Kard. Nycz: módlmy się za Ukrainę' (2014, 03 March), Rzeczpospolita. 
192 Nizinkiewicz, J. (2014, 03 March) 'Gen. Koziej: Polska jest zagrożona', Rzeczpospolita.
193 Olczyk, E. (2014, 04 March) 'Polska żąda ostrych sankcji', Rzeczpospolita.
194 Nizinkiewicz, J. (2014, 10 March) 'Brudziński: Polsce nie trzeba euro, a Ukrainie Balcerowicza', Rzeczpospolita. 
195 Overall, the current Polish Eastern policy is presented in a positive light, when Brudzinski dismisses the 
criticism of a fellow party member issues towards Sikorski. 
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article from mid-March titles “Putin has no intention of stopping”, suggestive
of the worst indeed.196 It  reads as if the author had certain proof that “On
Monday, Moscow started a diplomatic campaign with the aim to render all of
Ukraine dependant on Russia”. The final passage of the article offers hope in
introducing the adversary: “The West can still thwart the plans of the Russian
president”, and gives the floor to the Polish foreign minster who announces
stricter sanctions on Russia, which “might even lead to the downfall of Putin's
regime”. These, notably, are almost the same words as the above mentioned
coverage of late February; in a video interview with the renowned journalist
Woycicki  at  the  bottom  of  the  article,  he  repeats  the  difficult  economic
situation  the  Russian  government  would  find  itself  in.  Such  double-
verification has a more persuasive effect.
Gazeta Wyborcza
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The identification of narrative frames for  Gazeta Wyborcza proved somewhat
more complex, as it presented a more nuanced picture. Despite this, as will be
shown,  the  frames  adopted  centred  around  familiar  themes  of  the  Polish
national identity discourse: Poland was narrated as an actor that represents
the  European  community  of  values,  understands  its  regulations,  and  is
influential  in  setting the  agenda for  important  issues  such as  the  Ukraine
crisis. Another frame which revolves around progress and Europeanness, is
the narration of Poland as role model to Ukraine. However, there is also an
understanding  of  positive  demarcating  of  Poland in  its  solidarity  towards
Ukraine,  a  commitment  that,  as  is  argued,  implicitly  distinguishes  it  from
other EU- members. The usage of Russia as antithetic to Europe is common to
both papers. 
Exemplification of rhetorically practised political patriotism
Poland as gatekeeper of European values 
A prominent frame of coverage sympathetic towards the governmental line is
Poland as rule-abiding European agent. This is usually narrated by presenting
either Sikorski's or the prime minister Donald Tusk's position on Ukraine as
committed, but rational advocate of Ukraine. On 28 November,  GW referred
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to the interview the former gave to RZ about the crisis.197 This short piece can
be understood as  a  response to  criticism directed at  the government,  that
more financial support should be granted to Ukraine. As already indicated in
the title, Sikorski is quoted as rejecting to “bid against Russia”, and that it is
due to Ukrainian reluctance to reform that European financial support will
not be given out to waste.198 
Similar to  coverage of  early December,  a  number of  favourable articles  on
Polish diplomacy's as exemplary in the European context,  appeared in late
January  and early  February:  reportage  of  Sikorski  attempting  to  persuade
fellow EU members of a necessary common defence,199 as well as of Tusk's
campaign  to  inform  and  advise  the  same  on  the  situation  in  Ukraine,200
suggest  their  status  and  authority  internationally.  In  early  March,  Prof.
Rotfeld  suggests  forming  a  Ukraine-focussed  working  group  in  the  EU,
making proud reference to Poland as a European country that understands
the Union's cause better than its old member states, as it is willing to sacrifice
for  those  in  more  dire  need.  In  this  respect,  he  refers  a  Polish  MEP's
declaration that the country's EU budget has been raised to accommodate "the
needs of the poorest", to which the  French president at the time allegedly
responded: "I feel ashamed that the new countries had to teach us a lesson on
European solidarity".201 In this context, the Polish ex-president Kwasniewski's
view i. He explicitly expresses approval of the Polish governmental actions in
the crisis as doing "precisely everything that needed to be done. Mobilising
the  NATO  is  the  right  move."202 Kwasniewski's  recognised  expertise  on
Eastern  foreign  policy  gives  his  judgement  a  weight  that  is  hard  to
197 'Sikorski w "Rz": Nie będziemy się z Rosją licytować'(2013, 28 November), Gazeta Wyborcza.  
198  The same position is repeated only a couple of days later, where the journalist interviewing Sikorski does not 
oppose the foreign minister's view that Europe should not pump vast amounts into Ukraine corrupt domestic 
system”, but has to expect reforms. See: Wroński, P. (2013, 01 December) 'Sikorski dla "Wyborczej": Czy 
Janukowycz oszukał UE? W ostatniej chwili zmienił zdanie, argumenty Rosji przeważyły', Gazeta Wyborcza.
199  'Sikorski: UE potrzebne są siły bojowe opłacane ze wspólnej kasy' (2013, 01 December), Gazeta Wyborcza. 
200 'Premier Tusk objeżdża stolice UE: "ważna polska inicjatywa ws. Ukrainy" (2014, 02 February), Gazeta Wyborcza.
201 'Prof. Rotfeld: Stwórzmy grupę pomocy dla Kijowa' (2014, 07 March), Gazeta Wyborcza.
202 'Kwaśniewski: Rosjanie robią, co chcą, a Zachód musi przyjmować te fakty' (2014, 02 March), Gazeta Wyborcza
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overestimate,  while  his  assessment  simultaenously  affirms  Polish
Europeanness  by  knowing,  and  accordingly  acting,  within  Western
institutions. 
A sense of pride is furthermore visible in coverage on the foreign minister's
subsequent visit to Ukraine. The picture heading the article "How Sikorski
negotiated in Kiev" shows him surrounded by international politicians and
camera men as everyone's attention is on him, while he speaks to the many
microphones pointed at him. The picture had been used for an earlier article,
too,  but  this  time the colours  are  saturated in  a  way as  to  make Sikorski
appear more tanned in comparison to those surrounding him. It rolls out the
details  of  his  negotiations with Yanukovych on 21 February.  The article  is
written  in  a  very  literary  style  that  visualises  the  battlefield  scenario  the
diplomats found in Kiev, as "they understood they were at war." A change of
scenery takes the reader to observing the German foreign minister caught up
with his business,  as he receives a direct,  urgent,  phone call from Sikorski
who asks "Are you coming to Kiev with me?". Steinmeier did go, as implied,
on Sikorski's  initiative.  In this  article,  both Poland as significant  European
actor,  as  well  as  one  extraordinarily  engaged  for  the  Ukrainian  cause,
summarise the Polish self-understanding during the crisis fittingly. The article
concludes with a video to the "ambitious and confident man of the world",
presenting a brief summary of Sikroski's life achievements, illustrated with
pictures of the minister in action - with occasional Polish or European flags in
the  picture  -,  underscored  by  powerful  classical  music  that  suggests
importance and high status.203 The foreign minister furthermore received a lot
of  positive  coverage  in  mid-March,  as  increasing  international  recognition
reverberated  domestically.  As  Sikorski  appeared  in  political  talkshows  on
CNN and BBC as  an  expert  on the  crisis,  GW-coverage of  this  illustrated
203 In contrast, a portrait of another female politician who has been more vocal in recent months, is accompanied by 
a light-hearted, cheerful melody.
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approval.204 The  latest  article  included  for  this  research  is  a  piece  titled
"Sikorski  benefitting  from  the  crisis?  He  appears  on  BBC  and  CNN,  and
according to a Czech weekly, is 'Europe's new leader' ".205 The article shows
the cover page of the magazine, depicting the Polish foreign minister close-
up, with a European map in the background. While the heading might lead
the  reader  to  expect  a  relativisation  of  this  notion  in  the  article,  it  only
presents the highlights of the Czech coverge as considering Sikroski a leader
who "changes  European  politics  and  history";  the  above  mentioned  video
appears once again. 
Poland recognised as role model by Ukrainians
Another  frame  identified  for  GW-coverage  across  the  period  studied,  is
Ukrainian positive acknowledgement of Polish Europeanness: An article from
early December,  presenting the perspective of Ukrainians living in Poland,
details  people's  disappointment  in Ukraine “taking steps backwards” after
“the nation did everything in its power to take small steps in the European
direction”,  while,  in  contrast,  “in  Poland  so  much  has  changed”.206
Complementary to  Ukrainian citizens'  longing to follow the Polish model,
Ukrainian policy-makers with the same aspiration were given a voice. Andrey
Sadovy, the mayor of Lviv, appears to receive special attention in this context,
a fact that might be explained by a historic linkages of the city with Polish
history, hence its perception as more European. An interview with him has
the suggestive title “The Russians keep asking me why we want to join the
Union”;207 it builds up narrative tension, with the interviewer asking what the
204 'Sikorski w BBC: Dla Europy nadeszła godzina prawdy' (2014, 12 March), Gazeta Wyborcza. 
205 'Konflikt służy Sikorskiemu? Udziela się w BBC i CNN według czeskiego tygodnika jest "nowym liderem  
        Europy" ' (2014, 17 March), Gazeta Wyborcza. 
206 Żbikowska, I.; Szymanik, G. (2013, 01 December) 'Ukraińcy mieszkający w Polsce o protestach w ich kraju: Nie 
chodzi tylko o Unię. Walczymy o to, by władze zaczęły traktować nas serio', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
207 Bielesz, M.(2013, 06 December) 'Mer Lwowa: Rosjanie pytają mnie, dlaczego chcemy do Unii', Gazeta Wyborcza.
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mayor responded, and him answering bluntly “the truth”. On further enquiry,
Sadovy proceeds to elaborate on European values of justice and hard work
paying off, referencing Polish success in this respect. Asked about possibilities
to democratise Ukraine, Sadovy references Poland, and his strong statement
resounds with the reader: “I hold, and I always repeat this, the best way is the
Polish way, meaning a round table agreement. A dialogue between sensible
people.”208 Narration of Ukrainian appraisal of Polish Europeanness is in line
with  the  observations  above,  in  the  public  opinion  survey  on  Ukrainian
journalists.
Brotherhood: Polish solidarity for Ukraine and Ukrainians' gratefulness
As is evident from the table above, the “march of the million” which took
place  in  Kiev  in  early  December,  resounded  in  the  media's  heightened
emphasis on Polish solidarity for its neighbouring country. It was then that
GW initiated its campaign “Mи з Вами” [We are with you]. The paper asked
readers  and  journalists  to  send  in  photographs  of  themselves  holding
placards  of  the  slogan  with  the  Ukrainian  flag  in  the  background.  The
achievements  of  the  campaign  are  presented  by  an  uncommented  video,
showing Poles of all ages and in all kinds of situations holding the placards;
Ukrainian rap music suggests a sense of urgency and agitation.209 The positive
response of Ukrainians is reported as “Euromaidan says thank you to Poles:
the  response  to  the  paper's  initiative”.210 Indeed,  the  article  reads  like  a
response  to  the  video  of  05  December,  emphasising  from  the  outset  the
208  An article from late February picks up again on the frame of Lviv demonstrating its Europeanness. It describes 
how, despite no presence of security forces, self-organised and orderly things in Lviv remain. The subheading 
“Let us show that Lviv is a European city” is a quotation by Sadovy. 
       Tymots, I. ( 2014,20 February) 'Lwów, miasto autonomiczne: radzi sobie bez milicji i przyjmuje rannych z Kijowa',
Gazeta Wyborcza. 
209 Marczewski, J;Grzybowska, A. (2013, 05 December) 'Dziennikarze i czytelnicy ''Gazety Wyborczej'' razem dla 
Ukrainy', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
210 'Euromajdan dziękuje Polakom - odpowiedź na akcję "Gazety Wyborczej"' (2013, 08 December), Gazeta Wyborcza.
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universal gratefulness to Poles by a diverse Ukrainian nation: “women and
men of all ages, alone or with their friends, smiling, dressed in winter coats
and scarves, are holding up Polish flags on which is written 'thank you' in
Ukrainian national colours”. A lengthy quotation of an enthusiastic Maidan
activist  is  at  the  heart  of  the  article;  he  expresses  his  overwhelming
gratefulness for Polish pro-Ukrainian advocacy in the EU in recent years in
general,  and  during  the  ongoing  crisis  in  particular,  speaking  of
“brotherhood” and “solidarity”. The narrative of Polish citizens' initiatives in
support of the Ukrainian protests receives a follow-up at the end of January: a
three-minute video of  a  Polish pro-Ukrainian demonstration in  Warsaw is
shown, with people explaining their presence so that “every single Ukrainian
[…] knows that we support him”.211 The video follows the various activities
on the square, such as fund-raising and medication collection, with its last
minute  depicting  the  demonstrators  singing  a  solemn,  Ukrainian  song,  in
which  the  lines  resound “to  show that  we  are  brothers”,  after  which  the
crowd cheers and begins to chant the rhyme: “Joint cause: Kiev-Warsaw”. 
The frame of Polish solidarity for Ukraine is complemented by coverage on
political  elites  who  came  to  Kiev  to  demonstrate  their  support  for  the
country's opposition.  Expressing the high expectations towards the march, as
well as concern over Russian ambitions towards Ukraine, the article climaxes
with  reporting  an  united  post-Communist  satellite  states'  support  for  the
Euromaidan.  It  notes  the  explicit  criticism  of  the  Georgian  president
Saakashvili  of Russian imperialism, and proceeds to quote the Polish MEP
Jerzy  Buzek,  who justified  Polish  presence  on Maidan with  the  belief  “in
freedom,  independence,  solidarity.  We  want  to  express  our  solidarity  to
you”.212 The twofold mention of solidarity gives it all  the more weight.  As
illustrated above, in the Polish historical context,  'solidarity'  bears a strong
211 Więckowska, J. (2014, 31 January) ' ''My z Wami'' - wielka manifestacja wsparcia dla Ukrainy', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
212 Wilgocki, M; Bielecki, M. (2013, 07 December) 'Sobota na Euromajdanie. Wielkie wyczekiwanie na Marsz Miliona
Ukraińców', Gazeta Wyborcza.
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symbolic  meaning.  On  the  micro-level  of  this  text,  it  has  particular
significance especially with its overall anti-Russian sentiment. On the macro
level, the framing of Polish solidarity for Ukraine can arguably be seen as an
expression  of  Poland's  desire  to  complete  the  revolution  of  1989.  In  an
interview with Prof. Rotfeld on the same day, Polish solidarity is furthermore
pointed out as particularly noteworthy, in fact, as the title “Too many of us on
Maidan”,213 suggests, to the point of exaggeration. While Rotfeld positively
acknowledges the presence of politicians from all parties and their laudable
intentions, he argues that the “unequivocal truth [...] that we want a friendly
Eastern neighbour, a nation with the same ambitions and respect for universal
values”, might be mistaken for a hidden agenda given such numerous Polish
presence. 
Further  framing  of  the  exceptional  and  universal  Polish  pro-Ukrainian
engagement appeared as the crisis intensified in mid-February. Civil society
engagement  was  exemplarily  shown  in  an  interview  with  a  Polish
volunteer.214 The very visual description of the young girl's surroundings and
the danger she finds herself in, are telling of how much, namely everything,
Poles are willing to give for the Ukrainian cause. Other articles focus on the,
as titled, political “Polish consensus on Ukrainian matters",215 as Tusk, in his
speach in parliament appeals to the need for unity. The article dwells on the
extraordinary moment when, "after the prime minister's address, Kaczynski
clapped – probably for  the first  time since the Civil  Platform took office",
climaxing with a direct quotation of the opposition leader: "it is hard not to
agree with the prime minister". An interview with Sikorski, as well as another
article on the negotiations with Yanukovych suggest the Polish commitment
as having led towards betterment of the situation in Ukraine.216
213 'Prof. Rotfeld: Zbyt wielu polskich polityków pojechało na Majdan' (2013, 07 December), Gazeta Wyborcza. 
214  Górna, M. (2014, 18 February) 'Polka na Majdanie: "Milicja strzelała nawet do wolontariuszy" ', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
215 Grochal, R.; Czuchnowski W. (2014, 20 February) 'Polska zgoda w sprawie Ukrainy. W czwartek rozmowy z 
Janukowyczem', Gazeta Wyborcza..
216 Bielecki, T. (2014, 21 February) 'Janukowyczowi nie można wierzyć, ale trzeba z nim negocjować. Jak pogodzić te 
dwie sprzeczności?', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
52
The Europeanisation of Ukraine, as identified by the predominant discourse,
seems  accepted  as  an  unquestioningly  universal  Polish  interest  in  the
coverage,  and  while  Poland  is  presented  as  an  European  in  every  other
respect,  the  extensive  pro-Ukrianian  solidarity  and  advocacy  presents  an
image of Poland as the caring brother, who is a moral agent and steps in even
if  it  means  putting  himself  at  risk.  The  question  just  how  united  Polish
political elites are over the Ukraine crisis was an ongoing matter of interest
throughout the period of analysis. Only days after the cherished declaration
of  unity,  GW asks  whether  the  it  is  the  "end  of  unequivocal  agreement",
referring to criticism by PiS memebers directed at the government, as to the
timing and the content of the agreement with Yanukoych.217 The article is set
up  in  an  exchange  of  opinions,  where  the  voice  is  first  given  to  PiS
representatives, while the presidential advisor has the final, persuasive word.
He  expresses  bewilderment  at  the  idea  that  the  agreement  benefitted
Yanukovych,  as  he  repeats  twice  that  only  someone braindamaged would
suggest  this.  Another  article  dealing  with  the  renewed party  dissent  puts
Kaczynski  and  Tusk  at  opposition.218 Both  in  their  own words,  Tusk  first
expresses disappointment on PiS'  breaking with the cross-party consensus,
and  defends  Sikorski's  negotiations  as  successful.  Kaczynski's  opposition
remains moderate, as he acknowledges at the outset that Sikorski's words to
the Ukrainian opposition "if  you don't  sign this agreement you will  all  be
dead" were not harmful,  but that "things turned out well".  The opposition
leader, however, criticises Tusk's hesitance to "make the impossible happen"
for  Ukraine  as  "un-Polish".  Further  coverage  of  the  agreement,  in
consideration  of  intertextuality,  appears  supportive  of  the  governmental
position  in  presenting  the  foreign  minister's  perspective  indirectly,  and
through  interviews  with  him.219 Questions  such  as  "what  could  have
217 Grochal, R. (2014, 23 February) 'PiS atakuje Sikorskiego. Czy to koniec ponadpartyjnego porozumienia w 
sprawie Ukrainy?'Gazeta Wyborcza. 
218 'Tusk i Kaczyński o Ukrainie' (2014, 25 February), Gazeta Wyborcza. 
219 Sikorski: Do skorumpowanej ukraińskiej gospodarki nie popłynie fala pieniędzy z UE' (2014, 25 February).   
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happened without the agreement?", are unprovocative and invite the foreign
minsiter to elaborate on his success to have achieved "the only compromise
possible", and that much blood would have been shed otherwise. At the end
of the interview, the link to the video on the "ambitious and confident man of
the  world"  is  provided  yet  again.  The  debate  surrounding  his  strong
statement  to  opposition leaders  on February,  21,  appears concluded in his
favour by an article on Yanukovych's abandoned estate.220 From describing
findings of half-burnt documents on ordered snipers to shoot demonstrators,
the  article  ends  with  a  passage  on  Sikroski's  statement  which,  implicitly,
appears more than justified.
While  the  unequivocal  support  for  the  government  with  regards  to  the
Ukraine  crisis  was  reported  as  rather  short-lived  in  late  February,  on  05
March, GW published an article titled "MPs display solidarity for Ukraine",221
accompanied by a picture of the full parliament with all members standing up
with  solemn faces.  The  parliamentary  address  to  the  EU is  quoted  as  an
appeal  to  "take  up  initiatives  to  support  all  democratic  aspirations  of  the
country". Another article covering the parliament's extraordinary session titles
"With one voice on Ukraine", and literally gives the floor to Tusk - the picture
shows him standing at a podium while being watched attentivel by MPs - ,
who  "guarantees"  that  Poland  would  support  Ukraine  in  its  aspiration
towards closer  cooperation with the European Union,  and "reassures"  that
Poland is "no longer a country sensitive to repercussions" from sanctions on
Russia. The climax of the article builds up when Tusk asks all MPs for their
support, even in possibly future dire times. The answer appears in the next
paragraph: "And support he got". The article ends with a direct quotation by
       Gazeta Wyborcza. 
       Grochal, R.;Kurski, J. (2014, 25 February) 'Radosław Sikorski: Rolą wszystkich Ukraińców jest to, aby przelana 
krew nie poszła na marne', Gazeta Wyborcza 
       Grochal, R.;Kurski, J. (2014, 25 February)' Sikorski: Moskwa może być niezadowolona', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
220 Kośmiński, P. (2014, 25 February) 'W willi Janukowycza odnaleziono dowody, że snajperzy mieli rozstrzelać 
Majdan', Gazeta Wyborcza.
221 'Posłowie solidarni z Ukrainą [TREŚĆ UCHWAŁY]' (2014, 05 March), Gazeta Wyborcza.
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Kaczynski, who argues that "unity is indeed of uttermost importantance, and
quarrels over specifics have no substance"...,  concluding that "our stance is
and  will  remain  'into  Europe  via  Warsaw'.  May  it  be  this  way".  Indeed,
political unity appears unquestioned this time, as articles published shortly
after titled "What PiS is doing is beneficial to Poland, but not for PiS". 222 In the
interview,  MEP Kamisnki  begins  with grand notions  of  the  Ukraine  crisis
resuting  in  "Poles  finally  perceiving  that  they  are  in  this  together".  The
interview  is  built  around  the  consensus  of  such  unity,  as  the  interviewer
prompts "It turns out that our political elites are mature enough, and passed
the  test  in  the  event  of  real  threat".  Kaminski  proceeds  by  detailing  the
exemplary demeanour of all political parties, the government in particular as
"unusually strong but adequate". With regards to PiS, the MEP argues that
despite his lack of sympathy for the party, "it lived up to the task", especially
since  its  current  course  contradicted  the  usual  rhetoric  of  the  PO as  pro-
Russian and unpatriotic, hence impossible to cooperate with, a point which
Kaminski reapeats twice. The frame centering around unity of solidarity of
Polish political parties as desirable, and the fact that, for this time frame, it
was perceived as  accomplished,  is  in  line with the  disourse on the Polish
Eastern  mission,  the  completion  of  the  revolution  as  a  matter  of  utmost
importance  for  the  whole  nation.  The  sacrifice  PiS  is  paying  for  its  unity
policy  is  taken  up  by  one  more  article  from  the  database.  It  begins  by
describing angry riots in Cracow's suburbs by anti-Ukrainian protesters, and
moves  on  to  the  challenge  of  PiS  member,  who  "in  meetings  with  their
electorate deal with grudges as to the advocacy for the Ukrainian cause, as
"some  are  still  convinced,  that  Ukrainians  are  murderers  and  not  worth
speaking to". Referencing an opinion poll from January, the article illustrates
that Poles,  indeed, have mixed views on this matter,  as 41% assessed pro-
Ukrainian  political  engagement  positively,  while  47% found it  unjustified.
222 Nowakowska, A. (2014, 08 March) 'Europoseł Kamiński: To, co robi PiS, jest dobre dla Polski, ale nie dla PiS', 
Gazeta Wyborcza.
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This  number  is  surprising  given  that  remaining  coverage studied implied
citizens' universal enthusiasm for the Ukrainian cause. While the analysis of
public  opinion  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  this  situation  arguably
reflects the tensions of historic discourses and the elite position first promoted
by Kultura. While conviction of the mission to Europeanise the East has been
prevalent  among  the  political  leadership,  the  entrenched  discourse  of  the
savage East that included Ukraine - as reflected in the negative opinion polls
cited  above  -  has  evidently  not  disappeared  altogether.  This  possibility,
however, appears to be close to silenced by the media. 
It is interesting to note that coverage on political solidarity displays, across
the period studied, has come to be accompanied by simultaneously published
reports on citizens' engagement. The article on the passionate Polish online
boycott of Lukoil is set in a more critical tone as it elaborates on its futility
given the impossibility to establish which oil is of Russian origin;223 however,
the  article  ends with positive emphasis  of  the  good intentions  behind the
campaign, " especially as it serves a noble cause." 
Visualisation of situation in Ukraine: Appeal for more help
In mid-February, when protests began to escalate once more,  GW adopted a
frame which focussed on visualising the scenes in Kiev, accompanied by an
appeal directed at the Western community to intensify its support. This was
done by presenting both the Ukrainian and Polish voice in the matter. Articles
include coverage on the Youtube video “I am a Ukrainian”, as well as by the
Polish chief editor of the Kiev Times, as titled “Driving the car, I see people on
the streets. They are lying there, not moving.”224 An article by the Ukrainian
ex-dissident Marynovych reads as a strong appeal “to stop 'expressing deep
223 Majdan, K. (2014, 05 March) 'Czy bojkot Łukoilu ma sens? Uderza głównie w... Orlen', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
224 Wilgocki, M. (2014, 18 February) 'Dyrektor "Kyiv Post": Jadę samochodem. Widzę na chodnikach ludzi. Leżą, nie 
ruszają się', Gazeta Wyborcza.
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concern' and “listening to Putin's and Yanukovych's propaganda”, but to act
upon  the  values  of  the  Western  civilisation,  which  he  had  “always  been
admiring”.225 Another appeal to the Western community to intensify support
for Ukraine was presented in Mazyarski's emotive piece, in which he holds
that "by paying the sacrifice of blood, Ukraine morally acquired the right to
community membership", and one way to acknowledge this would be to set
up a memorial for "the fallen ones", the "martyrers", in Brussels.226 By using
such drastic, religious language, Europe is glorified as the epitomy of human
striving, which is strongly in line Polish identity discourse. 
Narrating the Russian threat and exclusivity of discourse
The framing of Russia in  GW as antithetic and threatening to Ukraine and
Europe did not always appear in isolation, but in conjunction with reports on
Polish  solidarity  and  Ukrainian  European  aspirations;  in  such  cases  a
judgement was made as to what frame appeared argumentatively prevailing.
The coverage on both countries' foreign ministers' meeting in late December,
similarly presented Lavrov in a comparatively negative light; a commentary
of the Polish ex-foreign minister explicitly criticised Sikorski for having ever
considered  cooperation  with  Russia,  and  as  acting  against  Polish  national
interest.227 
In  early  March,  similarly  for  GW,  coverage  increasingly  turned  to  Russia.
Reports initially were quite evenly split between the idleness of the Western
community,  while  others  bore  a  triumphant  note  that  "Ukraine  chose  the
225 Marynovycz, M.; Ehrlich, A. (2014, 20 February) 'Europo, zabierz się za rządzącą bandę. Usłysz ukraiński krzyk 
bólu!', Gazeta Wyborcza.
226 Mazyarski, W. (2014, 06 March) 'Wznieśmy w Brukseli pomnik europejskich męczenników', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
227 'Tusk i Sikorski działają wbrew polskiemu interesowi? Fotyga: Znam takie przypadki', (2014, 20 December), 
Gazeta Wyborcza. 
       Another piece, however, adopted a more pragmatic position which appears sympathetic to the governmental 
stance: in its argumentation line it suggests a moral victory for Sikorski, but notes that despite differences, 
“business as usual”continues, and that Russian-Polish relations are in de facto better than is generally assumed, a
stance which is not criticised in the text.
      Wronski, P. (0214, 20 December) 'Miłosierdzie Rosji, czyli starcie Sikorski - Ławrow przed dziennikarzami', Gazeta
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West,  and the  military  threat  only  solidified  this  choice".228 The  Ukrainian
historian Hrycak  suggested,  as  the  title  indicates,  that  "the  Russian  world
order broke down" and the country would "no longer have a say in Ukrainian
politics in the future",229 while others accounted for Putin's "defeat",230 and him
losing "all the pieces of the puzzle".231 Such Russian aggression was further
assessed as causing an irreversible rupture of Russian-Ukrainian relations.232
Drastic historic references were made, as in an interview with the government
member  Cimoszewicz,  in  which  he  was  asked whether  Putin  would  now
"proceed with his imperial march to Berlin?";233 while Cimoszewicz's response
takes away some of the initial edge, by noting that Putin's ambitions are more
likely to extend to central Asia, the interviewer appears more interested in
extreme scenarios,  as  the  following question is  "who operates  the  nuclear
button?". The overall framing is one in line with the view of Russian dissident
Ivanov,  who  holds  that  "the  deeply  entrenched  Russian  imperial  illness"
requires a "unitary and very forceful response".234 In a side comment, Ivanov
notes  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  "one  Ukraine,  because  the  difference
between Lviv and Donetsk is the same as that between France and Germany.
The Ukrainian nation is still in its making, it does not even have one language
in common," which, however, is not picked upon by the interviewer. 
In a general frame of Russia as antithetic to Poland, an article addresses the
views of Poles who have a counter-discursive opinion: "Polish defendats of
Putin: [...] they grow thanks to funding by the Kreml".235 The article on the
national  Political Observer  begins by referring to the paper as "hardly known
in  Poland",  while  it  goes  on  to  detail  its  pro-Russian  and  anti-Western
228 Smoleński, P. (2014, 01 March) 'Hrycak: Zawalił się rosyjski porządek świata', Gazeta Wyborcza.
229 Ibid.
230 Paweł Wroński (2014, 02 March) 'Nie powinniśmy Ukrainie składać obietnic, których nie potrafimy wypełnić', 
Gazeta Wyborcza. 
231 Grochal, R. (2014, 04 March) 'Cimoszewicz: Nie możemy robić w portki przed Rosją', Gazeta Wyborcza.
232  Wroński, P. (2014, 04 March) 'Prezydent Rosji zdobywa Krym, ale traci Ukrainę', Gazeta Wyborcza.
233 Grochal, R. (2014, 04 March) 'Cimoszewicz: Nie możemy robić w portki przed Rosją', Gazeta Wyborcza.
234 Wodecka, D. (2014, 02 March) 'Z Putinem trzeba twardo. On nie rozumie języka ugody', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
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coverage, which, further, Russian media "cited as independent Polish media
voice". While its chief editor is quoted as denying links with Russkyi Mir - a
Kreml-funded foundation  with the  aim to  promote  Russian language and
culture globally – the article ends with a long passage on the organisation's
acitivities, which creates a lasting impression that links must exist. It is not of
concern here to assess the concrete situation of existence of linkages; what is
significant,  is  this  news text  being a rare example of  coverage of  counter-
discursive voices in Poland. The implication remains that a Pole who holds a
divergent opinion, must have his statements funded by the Kreml. 
Counter-discursive views
The marginal cautioning frame gave weight to experts' opinion on the region,
who warned of the complexity and sensitivity of the situation. Such coverage
presents  an  article  early  in  the  sample;  it  recounts  the  position  of  Lech
Walesa,236 and titles: “Walesa: Brussels cannot replace Moscow for Ukraine.
Who will give them hot water and power once Russia turns it off?”. It follows
the ex-President's argumentation who sets out to appeal that the dependency
of  Ukraine  on  Russia  is  much  underestimated,  and  that  only  “theory-
politicians” would advice Ukraine to cut its links with Russia.  The author
does not question Walesa's statement which appears to counter the general
assumption  that  the  Polish  post-89  path  was  the  only  and  right  choice.
Referencing  the  hardships  Poland  experienced  in  the  1990s,  Walesa  asks
whether  things  really  had to  be so  difficult.  The  Ukrainian divide is  only
addressed  by  one  other  article  analysed  in  this  research.237 Rather  than  a
reflection  of  reality,  the  author  views  it  as  a  product  of  the  Party  of  the
Regions' division of electoral districts, and it consequently being instrumental
236 'Wałęsa: Ukrainie Bruksela nie zastąpi Moskwy. Kto im dostarczy ciepłą wodę i prąd, kiedy Rosja wyłączy?' 
(2013, 26 November), Gazeta Wyborcza. 
237 Czech, M. (2014, 21 February) 'Putin zabierze Ukrainie Krym? Zanim zechce to zrobić, musi pomyśleć 10 razy. Bo
Waszyngton nie odpuści', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
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to  certain  interest  groups,  but  most importantly,  serving Putin  as a useful
propaganda  tool.  A deeper  investigation  as  to  possibly  differing  levels  of
enthusiasm  pro  European  integration  in  Ukraine,  however,  remains
completely  absent.  In  a  similar  vein,  frames  which  would caution  against
rushing to Europeanise Ukraine, or warn against militarising counter Russia
remain, apart from very few examples, marginal. In early March, an interview
with the German Ukraine expert  Lang was published.  The scholar argues,
prompted by the question why the West should respond, that it should "ease
tensions",  in  the  same way it  refrained from much action during Russia's
intervention in Georgia; only this way, he argues, "was the conflict frozen",
and in the long term the country could still pursue closer cooperation with
Europe";238 this  view remains unopposed by the author.  However,  a frame
which  does  not  employ  a  strong  anti-Russian  tone  in  combination  with
appeals to maximal mobilisation, or would detail various Russian subversive
attempts, is not employed.  
Conclusion
This paper critically examined the portrayal of a crucial period of the Ukraine
crisis in Polish newspapers, as to the extent to which such coverage reflected a
practice of the rhetorical unconscious of political correctness in relation to the
self  and  Other.  Its  conclusions  are  based  on  an  exemplary  analysis  of
discursive in mechanisms, as revealing of such assumptions.
Delineating  focal  points  for  national  identification  which  require  positive
distinctiveness  versus another, Polish discourse was found to be, due to the
country's discursively peripheral position between 'Europe' and 'the East', in
need to adopt a vigorously Oriental narrative of the Eastern Other and the
European  self.  As  was  illustrated,  this  involved  selective  interpretation  of
238  Kokot, M. (2014, 03 March) 'Niemiecki ekspert: Zachód powinien wygasić ten konflikt', Gazeta Wyborcza. 
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Polish  history  to  manifest  the  'correct' narrative  of  Polishness;  prominent
Polish cultural works served to illustrate  such denigration of the lands and
people East of Poland. With a consequent emphasis on Ukraine, the paper
proceeded to analyse – against the backdrop that dominant identity discourse
shapes  assumptions  permeating public  opinions  as  well  as foreign  policy
paradigms - how such identity narratives impacted upon these two spheres in
Poland  in  more  recent  history.  It  was  shown  that  the  image  of  Oriental
Ukraine which had discursively been proliferated, had impacted negatively
on public opinions Poles held on the country. In contrast,  it  was argued, a
strand of discourse that was formulated around an ideology of the revised
European  identity  narrative,  had  guided  the  country's  political  elites  to
pursue  ever  closer  cooperation  with  Ukraine,  with  the  aim  to  eventually
Europeanise it,  as  national mission  for the last 25 years.  In this way, while
Polish  diplomacy  was,  in  comparison  to  that  of  other  EU-member  states,
rather  engaged  for  the  Ukrainian  cause  during  the  crisis,  this  paper
contextualised  the  efforts  as  a  continuity  of  political  elites'  earlier
commitment. In light of  the - until recently  -  negative  image of Ukraine in
Poland on the one hand, and political  elites' 'Ukrainophilia' on the other, an
analysis on newspaper coverage sought to shed light on what assumptions of
the self and Other have come to be predominant  in the main institution of
public  discourse nowadays.  The level  of support  for Polish diplomacy,  the
reportage of sympathy for the opposition movement, and lastly the portrayal
of the role of Russia were found to be key indicators of such discourse. 
Indeed,  a  dissection  of  the  framing  of  news  articles  in Rzeczpospolita and
Gazeta Wyborcza largely revealed an automated cross-cutting affirmation in
practice of political patriotism, of Polish identity as European and guided by
the revised Eastern mission myth. A strong tendency was identified to single
out Polish achievements for Ukraine as exemplary, as universally recognised
by its citizens, and furthermore by governments of fellow EU-member states
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and the United States. The urgency of Polish political unity as a key theme of
coverage  in  both  papers  similarly  reveals  the  assumption  that  the  crisis
requires  the  highest  level  of  national  attention,  a  mission  indeed.  The
portrayal  of  Russia  as  permeated  by  historical  references  and  future
hypotheses presented as if  certainty, reveals the persistance of the Oriental
discourse  on  the  Polish  Eastern  neighbour  as  antithetic  to  Europe.  The
triumphant  undertone  over  Russia  in  a  number  of  articles  suggests
confidence,  arguably  derived  from  the  general  recognition  of  Polish
achievements.
While  the  Ukrainian  opposition  movement  is  portrayed  in  a  sympathetic
light,  a  paternalistic  stance  continued  to  permeate  the  framing  of  events.
Firstly, Ukrainians were almost unquestioningly, and in absence of in-depth
analysis, reported as unequivocally pro-European; secondly, the protests were
framed as  modelled  according  to  the  Polish  example  set  25  years  earlier,
rather than investigated more closely as something sui generis. The newspaper
coverage,  while  in  acceptance  of  what  started  as  an  elitist  project  of  the
Eastern mission by European means, thus, is nevertheless formulated on the
implicit notion of an unequal brotherly relation between Poland and Ukraine.
While this paper found the study of the portrayal  of  the Ukraine crisis  in
newspapers as automated by a rhetorical unconscious of political patriotism
worthwhile especially for the Polish case,  it  does not suggest  that identity
discourse as reflected in media portrayals is a phenomenon unique to Poland.
In fact, the tendency of pre-conceived understanding of the self and Other as
automatising particular framing of coverage of the Ukraine crisis was pointed
out by the scholar Gabriele Krone-Schmalz for German media:239 she pointed
out that academia should endeavour to study the ways in which notions of
the self and the Other are produced and re-produced, which is precisely what
239 Zapp (2014, 16 April) 'Das darf nicht sein', NDR.de: Das Beste am Norden. 
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this paper attempted to do in relation to Poland. National identity discourse is
a  powerful  lense  through which  new events  come to  be  viewed,  and the
singularitisation of narrative, as was argued, is even more prominent in a case
which presents the opportunity for positively distinctive identification. 
It  was  shown  that  the  revised  Eastern  mission  myth,  in  line  with  Polish
identity  narrative,  guided  foreign  policy  and  was  accepted  across  the
country's  political  spectrum,  exemplarily  demonstrated  through  Poland's
leading  papers.  The  coverage  in  Rzeczpospolita and  Gazeta  Wyborcza
furthermore  suggested  high  levels  of  Polish  citizens'  support  for  the
Ukrainian  opposition  movement;  indeed,  larger-scale  protests  in  Poland
organised  in  support  of  Ukraine,  as  well  as a  number  of  local  initiatives
proclaiming "Ми з Вами'',240 might lead to the assumption that the previously
elitist  project  of  the Eastern mission had a  trickle-down effect  so  as to  be
viewed as a nation-wide project by many Poles. This would imply that the
Oriental understanding of Ukrainians, as promoted by discourse exemplified
in With Fire and Sword was revised. However, isolated coverage noted that a
number of Poles continued to reject its Eastern neighbour on this very basis,
thus, citizens'  support might not be as universal as the media portrayal of
everyone's solidarity might suggest. Hence, further research into the extent to
which  public  opinion  on  Ukraine  is  permeated  by  an  understanding  of
Eastern mission versus the discourse of the savage Other is needed. 
The protracted crisis  in Ukraine coincided with the 10-year anniversary of
Polish EU-membership. As Poland celebrated the event as an “opportunity
seized”,  the  foreign  minister  Radoslaw  Sikorski,  once  again,  flagged  the
country's struggle as a model for Ukraine:
240  'My z Wami, Ukraino!!!' (2014) Zespol szol nr. 2 im. Wladyslawa Jagielly w Mragowie.; Bykowski, E. (2014, 03 March)
'W tej walce jesteśmy z Wami!' Gazeta Olawa. 
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"Ten years is no more than an historical eyeblink. A quarter of a century covers a single
generation. And yet, in this short time, we have managed to transform our part of Europe.
Looking back at our success, we hope it can be replicated by those currently implementing
tough reforms in our neighbourhood – and often paying for it in blood, like the heroes of the
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